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Abstract
This paper develops techniques to analyze the adoption decisions of both consumers and
firms for competing platform intermediaries in two-sided markets, and applies the methodol-
ogy to empirically measure the impact of vertical integration and exclusive contracting in the
sixth-generation of the U.S. videogame industry (2000-2005). I first introduce a framework
to structurally estimate consumer demand in these types of hardware-software markets which
(i) simultaneously analyzes both hardware and software adoption decisions; (ii) accounts for
dynamic issues including the selection of heterogenous consumers across platforms, durability of
goods, and agents’ timing of purchases; and (iii) explicitly provides the marginal contribution
of an individual software title to each platform’s installed base of users. Demand results show
the gains obtained by a platform provider from exclusive access to certain software titles can be
large, and failure to account for dynamics, consumer heterogeneity, and multiple hardware pur-
chases significantly biases estimates. I next specify dynamic network formation game to model
the adoption decision of hardware platforms by software providers. Counterfactual experiments
indicate that vertical integration and exclusivity benefited the smaller entrant platforms and not
the dominant incumbent, which stands contrary to the interpretation of exclusivity as primarily
a means of foreclosure and entry deterrence.
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1 Introduction
In most platform and two-sided markets, consumers adopt, join, or visit a platform in order to
access goods or services provided by firms also affiliated with that platform. These industries
include “hardware-software” markets, content and media markets, retail marketplaces, payment
systems, and even some forms of “buyer-seller networks.”1 Often certain firms and their products
have significant market power over consumers, inducing consumers to adopt the platform(s) that
these firms have joined. Via exclusive contracts or vertical integration, platforms compete fiercely
to get these firms exclusively “onboard” and dominate – if not tip – the market. This paper studies
these types of exclusive vertical arrangements between platforms and firms and measures their
impact on industry structure and competition.
Whether or not such arrangements are primarily pro- or anti-competitive is still a source of active
debate and an open empirical question. On one hand, exclusive contracts raise antitrust concerns
since they may reduce competition by deterring entry or foreclosing rivals.2 The presence of network
externalities prevalent in these types of markets heightens this fear: not only does exclusive access
to the services or goods of a particular firm draw more consumers onboard a platform, but in
a dynamic and networked context this effect may be amplified.3 Furthermore, from a consumer
welfare perspective, these vertical arrangements may limit consumer choice by preventing consumers
on competing platforms from accessing exclusive content, products, or services.
On the other hand, exclusive arrangements are also argued to have pro-competitive benefits.
Standard theoretical justifications include the encouragement of investment and effort provision by
contracting partners.4 Other possibilities also emerge within networked environments. In nascent
markets, integration into one side of the market by a platform provider may be effective in solving
the “chicken-and-egg” coordination problem, one of the fundamental barriers to entry discussed
in the two-sided market literature.5 Furthermore, exclusivity may be an integral tool used by
1Examples of hardware-software markets include CD and DVD players and their respective media, videogame
consoles and games, and PCs and their compatible applications or peripherals (where hardware usually refers to the
CPU and OS combination). Many standard battles occur within these industries, whereby the success of compet-
ing hardware platforms (e.g., VHS/Betamax, HD-DVD/Blu-ray) depends crucially on the provision of compatible
software. Other examples include: cable/satellite television, satellite/terrestrial radio, internet portals/aggregators,
and online music services; shopping malls, department stores and brick-and-mortar merchants who “rent” space to
vendors and manufacturers; credit and debit cards (Visa, Mastercard) and electronic money systems (Paypal, FeliCa,
Edy); and HMOs and hospitals as buyer-seller networks, whereby consumers join the former to access the services of
the latter. Online advertising exchanges (Google, Microsoft, Yahoo!) are also examples, whereby the relevant parties
are advertisers who join to get access to “publishers,” or sites where ads are shown.
2See, e.g., Mathewson and Winter (1987), Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991), and Bernheim and Whinston
(1998). Whinston (2006) and Rey and Tirole (2007) provide excellent overviews of the theoretical literature on
vertical foreclosure.
3E.g., exclusivity induces more consumers to join a platform, which in turn encourages more firms to subsequently
join, and then more consumers, and so on. Thus, an entrant platform may not be able to gain critical mass and
hence be deterred from entering (Shapiro, 1999). Evans (2003) discusses other related antitrust issues brought up
within two-sided markets. Accessible surveys of the network effects literature in general are Katz and Shapiro (1994),
Shy (2001) and Farrell and Klemperer (2007). Empirical papers on measuring the impact of indirect network effects
include Saloner and Shepard (1995), Gandal, Kende, and Rob (2000), and Rysman (2004).
4See, e.g., Marvel (1982), Klein (1988), Besanko and Perry (1993), and Segal and Whinston (2000).
5I.e., without firms, consumers will not join a platform; however, without consumers, firms will not join. See e.g.,
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entrant platforms to break into established markets: by preventing contracting partners from also
supporting the incumbent, an entrant may spur adoption of its own platform and thereby spark
greater platform competition.6
Given the growing prevalence of networked and platform industries, the ability to resolve this
theoretical ambiguity is of central importance for policy and regulation. Not only were the compet-
itive implications of integration and exclusive contracting at the heart of recent prominent antitrust
cases in networked industries – U.S. v. Microsoft [253 F.3d 34 (2001)],7, European Union v. Mi-
crosoft [COMP/C-3/37.792 (2004)], and U.S. v. Visa [344 F.3d 229 (2003)]8 – but they are also
the central issues to consider whenever evaluating the impact of exclusive carriage deals in the
media industry9 or determining whether or not to open up closed hardware-software systems to
competitors.10
This paper has two primary goals. The first is to provide a framework for analyzing the adoption
decision of both consumers and firms for competing platform intermediaries. Fundamentally, any
analysis of how exclusive arrangements affect a platform market’s competitive structure requires
an understanding of how parties on each side of the market choose which platform to join. The
challenge is to account for the inherent dynamic nature of a networked industry, whereby each
agent makes a choice anticipating the future actions of others. A consumer times her purchase and
chooses a particular platform anticipating the adoption decisions of other firms and consumers (as
well as the future paths of prices and qualities); similarly, a firm joins a platform only after forming
expectations over the number of consumers and other firms that will also come onboard.
The second objective is to apply the methodology to empirically measure the impact of exclusive
contracting and vertical integration by hardware providers into software provision in the sixth
generation of the US videogame industry (2000-2005). As a canonical hardware-software market
comprising three differentiated hardware platforms each with its own distinct base of software, the
videogame industry exhibits features easily generalizable to a variety of networked environments
– indeed, two of the main platform providers, Sony and Microsoft, are themselves participants in
myriad other platform environments. The videogame industry is also convenient to study since
Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Armstrong (2006), Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006).
6Lee (2006) provides a related model of platform competition whereby a large enough marginal contribution of a
single firm is sufficient to prevent the market from tipping completely to one platform.
7See Whinston (2001) for a discussion on the Microsoft case, which involved Microsoft’s integration of Internet
Explorer into Windows and the possible foreclosure of Netscape, a rival browser application provider.
8The Visa case dealt with the possible foreclosure of competing payment cards (American Express and Discover)
from accessing the services of exclusive member banks; Rochet and Tirole (2002) provide an economic analysis and
discuss the potential antitrust concerns within the payment card industry.
9E.g., in 2007 Major League Baseball and satellite television operator DirecTV agreed to an exclusive deal which
would deny cable television subscribers access to a package of out-of-market games. The deal was eventually scuttled
after a U.S. Senate hearing into the issue pressured MLB to renegotiate with excluded parties; MLB ultimately agreed
to supply television feeds of out-of-market games to both cable and satellite TV operators under threat of losing its
anti-trust exemption (“Baseball Strikes Deal to Keep ‘Extra Innings’ Package on Cable,” Associated Press, April 4,
2007).
10E.g., France recently passed a law that allowed regulators to require Apple to open up its iTunes music service to
other companies’ music players (“French iTunes Law Goes Into Effect,” Associated Press, August 8, 2006). Consumer
rights organizations in other countries including Germany, Finland, and Norway as well as the European Union
consumer chief have taken similar stances (“EU takes aim at Apple over iTunes,” Reuters, March 11, 2007).
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exclusionary contracting or integration by platforms into software development is not intended to
foreclose other third-party software providers; on the contrary, any exclusive titles are intended to
attract other software developers as much as they are intended to attract consumers.11 As a result,
focusing on the videogame industry can separate out the possible foreclosure effects in software
provision and instead focus on foreclosure at the platform level.
The main finding of this paper is that exclusive arrangements and vertical integration benefited
the two smaller entrant platforms at the expense of the industry incumbent, and were generally
pro-competitive at the platform level.12 Absent the ability to produce or acquire exclusive ti-
tles, competitive conditions would have been vastly different: the incumbent would have captured
an even more commanding share of the market than it did, with the two entrants increasingly
marginalized. As such, the ability to integrate and engage in these exclusive arrangements may
have prevented monopolization by a single hardware provider.
However, when exclusive vertical arrangements are prohibited, consumers are shown to possibly
benefit from access to a greater selection of software titles onboard any given platform holding fixed
the pricing and entry/exit decisions of all platform providers and software titles – consumer welfare
would be predicted to increase by about $7B during the five year period analyzed. However, this is
partially a static result; whether or not consumers would have truly been better or worse off depends
crucially on how software production would have responded to the lack of integration or exclusive
dealing, and how the dominant platform would have reacted to its increased market power. If either
previously integrated “first-party” titles no longer are produced, or if monopolization induced the
exit of competing platforms (even without raising prices), any potential consumer welfare gains
from increased access to software would be mostly eliminated.
Even though the impact on consumer and hence total welfare is ambiguous, the analysis nonethe-
less robustly predicts that lack of these exclusionary vertical agreements would concentrate market
power and yield one dominant platform provider. This highlights the importance of accounting
for dynamic consequences (increased platform competition and investment) when addressing the
potential static costs and inefficiencies (reduced access and software variety onboard each platform)
of exclusive arrangements.
When considering this implication in a broader context, it is important to note that “forced
exclusivity” contracts – whereby a software developer would not be allowed to release software for
a hardware platform unless it did so exclusively – are implicitly not considered when evaluating
the effects of exclusivity. During most of the 1980’s and 1990’s, the dominant videogame platform
provider, Nintendo, used to force its developers to release games exclusively via these contracts.
However, following a 1992 antitrust investigation related to Atari Games Corp v. Nintendo of
11Unlike the computer application space whereby users typically only need one word processor, browser, or media
player, videogames are not direct substitutes for one another and are instead more like “disposable” media goods
which face demand for continual replacement. Thus exclusive software, by drawing onboard more consumers, increases
the potential market that another software providers can access but does not crowd out or compete against these
other titles.
12One of the “entrants” (Nintendo) was itself a veteran of the industry, but entered (alongside Microsoft) with its
sixth-generation console a year after the dominant platform provider (Sony).
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America, Inc [975 F.2d 832 (1992)], Nintendo dropped these practices.13 Since then these contracts
have not been utilized or observed within the videogame industry, and will not be considered within
the space of vertical agreements considered here.14
Previous empirical work on measuring the effects of exclusive dealing and foreclosure has pri-
marily focused on supply-side efficiencies and the possibility of “upstream” foreclosure. Asker
(2004) and Sass (2005) analyze the relationship between manufacturers and distributors in the
beer industry, and find evidence that exclusive arrangements seem to enhance efficiency, improve
distributor effort, and do not foreclose smaller brewers. Chipty (2001) studies the integration
between programming and distribution in the cable television industry, and finds that although
certain programming may have been foreclosed from distribution by integrated cable providers, the
associated efficiency gains have likely offset any social costs generated.
In contrast, this paper focuses on the competition between “downstream” platforms, and pri-
marily how integration and exclusivity interacts with the networked aspect of the industry in
attracting both software and consumers to join. I examine a counterfactual regime whereby plat-
forms are unable to integrate into software development, and exclusive contracts are prohibited. To
do so, I determine both demand (consumer) and supply (software) responses to such changes. This
paper is the first to my knowledge to estimate dynamic demand for multiple “sides” in a platform
market, and explicitly account for the rematching process between contracting partners within a
counterfactual regime.
1.1 Framework for Analysis
The paper is structured in three parts: the first two develop and apply a framework for analyzing
how industry participants chose which hardware platform to purchase or develop for, and the third
applies estimates obtained from these first two stages to evaluate regimes in which exclusionary
vertical contracts are prohibited.
Consumer Demand
The first part of this paper focuses on analyzing consumer demand, and develops a methodology
for structurally estimating a demand system in general platform-intermediated markets. Although
also of independent interest, the primary purpose of this section is to determine how consumer
demand for hardware responds to changes in software availability, and what consumer demand for
any given piece of software would be conditional on that title developing for any set of platforms.
These estimates are used as inputs in the second part of the paper, which focuses on determining
which platform(s) a software title will join and hence requires an estimate of each title’s expected
profits; this in turn requires a prediction of not only how many people onboard a platform will
13Shapiro (1999), Kent (2001).
14These types of forced agreements have also been ruled to be anti-competitive in other industries: e.g., the courts
in U.S. v. Visa found these types of contracts to “weaken competition and harm consumers” by limiting output of
rival payment card providers and foreclosing them from competing in related markets.
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purchase a particular title, but also how many more consumers will purchase the platform itself.
In networked industries, a consumer’s choice of platform in is a function of not only the plat-
form’s own characteristics, but primarily over the goods or services that are or will be available
onboard the platform. However, different consumers will choose different hardware platforms based
on their preferences over affiliated products: just as consumers choose a local community to best
satisfy their preferences as in Tiebout (1956)’s model of local expenditures, so do they behave with
respect to selecting a particular platform or hardware device.15 Consumers who have purchased
a platform are more pre-disposed to purchase those products onboard; failing to account for this
selection will lead to significant upward biases in estimates of the quality and contribution of goods
and services to that platform.
In response to this challenge, I explicitly account for this form of interaction between the
hardware and software sides of the market and develop a structural model of consumer demand
which: (i) simultaneously estimates both (hardware and software) sides of the market; and (ii)
accounts for dynamic issues including the selection of heterogenous consumers across platforms,
durability of goods, and agents’ timing of purchases. I leverage the dynamic aspect of my panel
data and use the differential responses of unaffiliated and affiliated consumers to changes in software
availability over time in order to identify the selection of consumer heterogeneity across platforms.
Via the demand system, I am also able to recover the marginal contribution of an individual
software title to each platform’s installed base of users. This point is one of the primary reasons
for adopting a structural approach in demand estimation. In these types of platform markets when
one side is oligopolistic and the identity of contacting partners matters, analyzing the impact of
exclusive arrangements requires computing how profits are affected when individual contracting
partners change.16 Although other papers have estimated demand systems in platform markets,
none have done so without ignoring or taking a reduced form approach to one side of the market,
and consequently have been unable to address both this concern as well as the selection of consumers
across platforms.17
Additionally, accounting for dynamic concerns is critical in platform markets as the affiliation
decision often involves the purchase of a durable good or agreement to a long-term commitment. A
large literature has shown the limitations of applying a static methodology to a dynamic setting.18
15Dubin and McFadden (1984) study a similar issue, in which household demand for electricity depends on the
choice of space or water heating.
16See e.g. Lee (2006). This is similar to calculating the underlying “value” functions in multilateral contracting
environments with externalities (e.g., Prat and Rustichini (2003)), partition functions in coalitional bargaining games,
and graph functions in bipartite network formation games (e.g., Bloch and Jackson (2007)).
17E.g., Song and Chintagunta (2003), Clements and Ohashi (2005), Prieger and Hu (2006), and Corts and Lederman
(2007) assume software utility on a platform is simply a function of the total number of titles on a system; Nair (2007),
although accounting for dynamic concerns, analyzes demand only for software and does not consider the hardware
side.
18E.g., a consumer does not purchase a durable good that she has already purchased in the past, and upon purchase
does not (usually) keep participating in the market; a consumer may purchase items in order to stockpile goods; and
a consumer may have expectations over future product availability and quality due to technological improvements,
and delay purchase not because current goods are inadequate, but because future goods may be more preferable. See
e.g., Melnikov (2001), Song and Chintagunta (2003), Hendel and Nevo (2006), Carranza (2006), and Gowrisankaran
and Rysman (2007) for other applications of modelling dynamic demand.
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To account for these dynamics in hardware and software adoption, I adapt and extend a number
previously introduced techniques – including those pioneered in Rust (1987), Berry (1994), and
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), and later synthesized in a dynamic context in Hendel and
Nevo (2006), Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2007) and Nair (2007) – in order to formulate and
solve each consumers’ dynamic optimization problem in a platform environment. The extensions
include the explicit handling of seasonality effects (crucial for most consumer product industries),
the persistence of unobservable product characteristics, and the use of a more general evolution
process for product qualities and prices.
Using a new dataset containing monthly level aggregate sales and prices for every hardware plat-
form and software title in the sixth generation of the videogame industry, I apply the methodology
to estimate consumer demand. Results show that the gains obtained by a platform provider from
exclusive access to certain software titles can be large: although most titles do not have any impact
on hardware sales, certain hit titles may be able to increase the installed base by 10% or more.
In general, failure to account for dynamics, heterogeneity, and multiple purchases by consumers
significantly biases the predicted impact a title has on the demand response of consumers.
Hardware-Software Network Formation
The second half of the paper examines the contracting decisions of software firms and hardware
platforms. In analysis of consumer demand, the set of software products for each platform and
at each point in time has been conditioned on in the data. However, when institutional features
of an industry change – as is the case when hardware platforms cannot vertically integrate into
software provision or offer contracts contingent on exclusivity – it is unlikely that the contracting
relationships between parties will remain the same. To determine the supply-side response of which
platforms each software title joins, I define and compute a new equilibrium for a dynamic network
formation game whereby software titles are allowed to freely choose which platforms to develop
for, having observed the previous actions of consumers and other industry agents and having
formed expectations over the future profitability of each potential strategy.19 The setup allows
for contracting partners and consumer demand to change over time with past actions influencing
future decisions, a key feature of any networked industry. Although each software title makes only
a single decision, each employs an equilibrium strategy depending only on the value and expected
evolution of certain payoff relevant state variables; furthermore, in equilibrium these expectations
over the variables are assumed to be consistent with their actual realizations. In this regards, this
model is similar in spirit to Ericson and Pakes (1995) and the literature that follows.
For the equilibrium computation, I require an estimate of the profits each software title expects
to receive if it chose to develop for any set of platforms. As discussed earlier, the expected number of
consumers who will purchase a given title is obtained from the first half demand estimates. However,
19Here, when platforms are forbidden to engage in exclusive deals, they are treated as passive agents. See Hagiu
and Lee (2007) for a model of platform competition whereby platforms actively bargain for (exclusive) content in
media markets.
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construction of profits also requires knowledge of the underlying “porting” costs of developing for
different sets of platforms. These are unobserved. To address this issue, I first assume each software
title chose the set of platforms which maximized its expected profit, and compute the difference in
profits (as a function of costs) each title would have expected to receive if it had instead chosen to
develop for a different set of platforms. I then recover an estimate of porting costs that rationalize
each title’s observed choice via an inequalities-based estimator developed in Pakes, Porter, Ho,
and Ishii (2006). To evaluate the fit of the dynamic network formation model and estimated
parameters, I initially fix the decisions of exclusive first-party titles and compute a new equilibrium
among remaining third-party titles. I find that the specified model accurately predicts platform
installed base figures, market shares, and contracting decisions for “hit” titles.
Counterfactual Experiments
Finally, I analyze a counterfactual regime in the absence of vertical integration and exclusive con-
tracting between hardware platforms and software titles, and compute the new predicted equilib-
rium outcomes. To account for the possibility that eliminating exclusive arrangements may have
affected the production of first-party titles, I compute two separate counterfactual regimes whereby
first-party titles are either assumed to enter as third-party products, or are eliminated altogether.
In both cases, counterfactual simulations indicate that the industry is far more competitive when
exclusive vertical arrangements are allowed than when they are prohibited.
1.2 Road Map
In the next section I describe the U.S. videogame industry, the role of vertical integration and
exclusivity, and important features and stylized facts of the market which must be captured for any
reasonable analysis. Section 3 overviews the theoretical issues involved with demand estimation in
platform markets, and develops the full dynamic model with the accompanying details on estima-
tion, inference, computation, and identification; estimation results are presented in section 4. I lay
the groundwork for computing the dynamic network formation game in section 5, and also discuss
how to recover the underlying porting costs borne by software firms. Finally, I analyze counter-
factual regimes whereby exclusive agreements are banned in section 6, and conclude in section
7.
2 Application: The U.S. Videogame Industry
2.1 Industry Description
Starting as a fringe industry in the early 1970’s with the introduction of a home version of Pong,
the U.S. videogame industry has since grown to reach $13.5B in revenues in 2006.20 Increasingly,
20Approximately $6.5B from console videogame software, $1B from PC videogame software, and the rest from
console hardware and accessories. Entertainment Software Association 2006 Sales, Demographic and Usage Data.
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as evidenced by the widespread adoption of the new generation of consoles introduced in 2006,
videogames have broadened their appeal and user base from a child’s hobby to something more
mainstream: 69% of American heads of households engage in computer and videogames with the
average age of a player being 33 years old,21 and market penetration of videogame consoles reached
41% of US television households (45M) in 2006.22
A videogame system comprises a hardware console (the platform) and software (its games). In
the current and most recent generations, each console is and has been provided by one firm – the
platform provider – as a tightly integrated and standardized device which is required in order to run
any of the titles provided for the system.23 Videogames, on the other hand, are brought to market
by two types of entities: developers, who undertake the programming and creative execution of each
title; and publishers, who handle the marketing and distribution of games. Publishers are usually
integrated into software development and have their own in-house development studios; although
independent software development studios do exist, as the costs of developing games have increased
over time – with average costs reaching $6M during the late 1990’s – these studios still must often
turn to software publishers for financing in exchange for distribution and publishing rights.24
Console manufacturers have also integrated into software publishing and development, with
each platform provider typically having its own publishing unit and game development studios.
Any title produced by the console maker via its own integrated studios or acquired and distributed
by its own publisher is known as a first-party title, and is exclusive to that hardware platform. All
other games are third-party titles and are produced by other firms. Within a generation, games
developed for one console are not compatible with other consoles; in order to be played on the other
console, the game must explicitly be “ported” by a software developer and another version of the
game produced.25 Consequently, the choice of which platforms to develop for is highly strategic: a
third-party software developer can release a title on multiple platforms in order to reach a larger
audience and pay additional porting costs (which may include development and distribution costs)
or develop exclusively for one console and forego consumers on other platforms. Even in the latter
case, the developer has multiple options: it can enter into a publishing agreement with the console
provider, or opt to sell its game or even entire studio outright.
Since videogame consoles usually have little if any stand alone value, consumers purchase a
particular console only if there are desirable software titles on that system.26 At the same time,
software publishers release titles for consoles that either have or are expected to have a large installed
base of users who potentially will purchase their games.27 These cross-side network externalities
212006 Essential Facts, Entertainment Software Association.
22The State of the Console, Nielsen Media Research. March 5, 2007
23NB: this is unlike the PC industry where a system’s hardware and operating system may be provided by different
firms, and can be modified and configured further by the end user.
24Coughlan (2001).
25A notable exception is “backwards compatibility,” whereby a new console can play the games made for the
previous generation of that particular console. For example, each of Sony’s three home videogame consoles could
play games made for the previous generation.
26Recently however, consoles have been able to perform more tasks such as watch DVDs, access the internet, and
purchase digital content or services.
27As primarily a fixed costs business, maximizing the potential audience for a title is one of the primary ways to
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and “two-sidedness” are manifest in most hardware-software industries, and in particular yields
a complex form of competition between rival platforms. In particular, on the pricing front most
videogame console manufacturers subsidize the sale of their hardware devices to consumers, selling
them close to or even below cost, and make profits by charging publishers and developers a royalty
for every game sold on that platform.28
As discussed in the introduction, as the dominant videogame platform provider during most
of the 1980’s and 1990’s, Nintendo used to write forced exclusivity contracts with developers,
committing them to 2-year exclusive deals in exchange for the right to develop for its system.
This changed following a 1992 antitrust investigation related to Atari Games Corp v. Nintendo of
America, Inc, and Nintendo dropped these practices. Since then, such forced exclusivity contracts
have not been observed. In their place, console manufacturers have primarily relied on internal
development, integration (i.e., outright purchase), or favorable contracting terms to third party
developers or publishers (e.g., lower royalty rates, lump sum payments, or marketing partnerships)
in order to secure exclusive titles. More recently, as games have been becoming more and more
expensive to develop, most third-party titles have chosen to multihome in order to access a wider
audience to recoup these fixed costs; consequently, console providers have become more reliant on
their own internal first-party titles to differentiate their platforms.29
2.2 The Sixth Generation: 2000 - 2005
The videogame industry typically witnesses the release of a new set of consoles approximately every
five years. Since hardware capabilities remain fixed within a generation to ensure compatibility and
standardization, it is only during these generational shifts that new hardware with more powerful
processing power and graphical abilities can be introduced. In October, 2000, Sony released its
Playstation 2 (PS2) console, among the first of what has since been referred to as “sixth-generation”
of videogame consoles.30 The PS2 was a followup to the original Playstation (PS1), Sony’s wildly
successful entry in the previous generation.31 Sony also had the advantage of being the first out of
the gate with a sixth-generation hardware; only a year later did industry veteran Nintendo release
its Gamecube (GC) and new entrant Microsoft bring its Xbox console to market. By the time the
first seventh generation console was introduced in October 2005, Sony’s new console would have
gone on to sell almost double the number of hardware devices as both its competitors combined.
This paper’s focus on the sixth-generation is for several reasons. First, it marked the arrival of
a new competitor – Microsoft – to the industry. Itself a veteran and competitor in other myriad
ensure development costs are recouped.
28See Hagiu (2006) and Evans, Hagiu, and Schmalensee (2006) for more on this point.
29Instead of complete exclusivity for third-party titles, there has recently been a greater use of “timed” exclusives
or exclusive “premium” add-ons to differentiate a title across platforms – the former allowing the console to have a
particular title exclusively for a set period of time (usually 6 months), the latter only becoming feasible with the rise
of downloadable content.
30Sega’s Dreamcast, released a year earlier, was discontinued on January 31, 2001 and is not considered in this
paper.
31The PS1 had sold over 70M units by that point, and would go on to sell over 100M units by the end of 2005. (
http://www.playstation.com/business.html)
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platform industries, Microsoft’s entry tactics included the acquisition of several software develop-
ers; whether or not Microsoft would have been able to gain a foothold into the industry absent
integration is an open question. Secondly, the three platform providers are the same as the current
(seventh) generation providers, providing timeliness to this line of inquiry. Finally, this particular
generation marked the first steps towards placing the videogame industry firmly within the con-
vergence battle between personal computers and other general consumer electronics. Starting with
the introduction of DVD and online capabilities with these consoles, videogame platform providers
have added significant non-gaming functionality to their devices such that they now function as
fully independent media hubs and thereby placed their consoles as platforms in several other mar-
kets.32 Consequently, these success or failure of these hardware devices vis a vis one another has a
dramatic impact on industries far removed from just videogames.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The main data comes from a new data set, and consists of monthly observations from January
1994 to October 2005. Each observation includes the average selling price and quantity sold of
each videogame console, the average selling price, quantity sold, and other descriptive information
for each software title on each console (including ratings provided by the industry Entertainment
Software Rating Board, genre, and date of release). Price, quantity, and software descriptive data
for videogame titles and consoles was obtained from the NPD Group, a market research firm, for
the dates specified.33 Prices are adjusted via the Consumer Price Index.34 In the data, there is
information on a total of 12 consoles, two of which existed prior to 1994 and the other 10 having been
introduced during the period of the data, and 6606 videogame titles. However, since the analysis
focuses on the sixth-generation, the data utilized is selected from the period between September
2000 and October 2005. During this period, three videogame consoles and 1581 unique software
titles were released. The population of potential consumers is given by the number of television
households collected on a yearly basis from Nielsen and linearly interpolated to the monthly level.
General descriptive statistics for each of the three sixth-generation consoles are provided in
table 1. What follows are additional stylized facts about the industry:
• Prices: Hardware prices followed very steady paths, interrupted only by two major discrete
jumps. The PS2 and Xbox started retailing for $300, but in May 2002 both simultaneously
cut their prices by $100 prior to the “E3” industry trade show. Nintendo followed with a
$50 price cut of its own from $200 to $150. Microsoft and Sony again quickly dropped prices
one after the other two years later. Figure 1 illustrates the price paths of each hardware
console. Software prices, however, follow much more regular price drops, with price cuts
usually following the first few months of a new title’s release.
32E.g., these new consoles are also able to play next-gen HD-DVD/BluRay discs, download movies and digital
content, watch IPTV, and network with other users across the internet.
33The information is collected from approximately two dozen of the largest retailers in the US, which account for
about 65% of videogame and console sales, and is extrapolated by NPD for the entire US market.
34All urban consumers, all items less food and energy.
11
• Seasonality: The videogame industry, like most consumer product markets, exhibits consider-
able seasonality both in consumer demand as well as in software supply. Figure 1 also shows
the number of total hardware consoles sold each month, and during holiday months (Novem-
ber and December) the number of consoles sold is easily double or triple the average number
sold in other months. Software supply also exhibits significant variance across months: some
have over 100 new titles released across systems, and others less than 5.
• Exclusivity and Multihoming: There is significant variation in the number of software titles
that are exclusive across platforms: although nearly 64% of all unique software titles are
exclusive to one console, the majority are located on the PS2. On the other hand, the
majority of GC tiles are available on the other two console systems. At the same time,
as seen in Table 2, the top titles for the GC are all exclusive whereas the PS2 has more
nonexclusive titles in its top sellers.
• Concentrated Software Sales: Videogames, like motion pictures, are primarily a hit driven
industry whereby most sales are concentrated among a few top-selling games. Despite there
being over 1500 unique titles released over the three sixth-generation consoles, the top 10
listed in Table 2 on the PS2, Xbox, and GC accounted respectively for 18%, 33%, and 47% of
total platform software sales. The concentration applies to software publishers as well – with
over 150 publishers who have released a game for a sixth generation console, the top 5 were
responsible for 50% of all software sold (by total quantity sales), and the top 20 responsible
for over 90%. Indeed, only 5 publishers command greater than 10% market share on any
given console, and 3 of them are the console manufacturers themselves: Sony, Microsoft, and
Nintendo. Finally, the concentration of software sales occurs early in a title’s life, with on
average over 50% of total sales occurring within the first 3 months of release.
• Significant Consumer Heterogeneity: According to Nielsen, the heaviest 20% of videogame
players account for nearly 75% of total videogame console usage (by hours played), averaging
345 minutes per day during the fourth quarter of 2006. At the same time, the fastest growing
segment of users are known as “casual gamers” who spend less than 5 hours a week playing
games.
3 Consumer Demand
In order to study the impact of a policy restriction on exclusivity, an understanding of how consumer
demand responds to changes in software availability is required. Not only is this used to compute
the resultant platform and software market shares following a change in industry structure, but
it also is needed to understand the incentives governing each software title’s decision of which
platform(s) to develop for in the first place. This section develops a structural model of consumer
demand for both hardware and software in general platform markets, and then applies it to the
videogame industry.
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I begin in 3.1 by overviewing the theoretical issues involved with consumer demand estimation
in platform markets, and introduce the main structural innovations of the paper within a static en-
vironment. These include endogenizing platform utility as a function of affiliated software products,
and handling the selection of heterogeneous consumers across platforms. I discuss why standard
discrete choice methods are not sufficient to capture realistic substitution patterns or elasticities of
demand within these markets, why they are not able to recover the quality or impact on demand
of an individual software title.
In 3.2, I present the full dynamic model used in estimation which not only allows for heteroge-
neous consumers and multiple hardware system purchases, but also for consumers to be forward-
looking agents: these consumers account for future software releases and pricing or quality changes,
and may delay purchase in anticipation of receiving higher utility in the future. The major as-
sumption I use to model consumer expectations is similar to but more general than the one used
in Melnikov (2001), Hendel and Nevo (2006), and Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2007): rather than
explicitly model supply-side decisions (which includes software availability and pricing) when evalu-
ating consumer expectations, I instead assume consumers use a reduced-form approximation of the
evolution of each product’s quality which depends on past values of itself and of other competing
products. These expectations are assumed to be rational in the sense that they are consistent with
the actual distribution of realized product qualities, and may be seen as reasonable approximations
of consumer beliefs.
I also make the additional assumption that software titles are imperfect substitutes, and each
title effectively competes within its own market. This assumption is not unreasonable for this
particular industry: for example, Nair (2007) finds empirically that videogames are generally not
substitutable for one another in his analysis of videogame software.35 Considering there are a large
number of titles (even within a particular genre), each with their own distinct idiosyncracies, plots,
characters and style of play, such reduced form results indicating no first-order substitution effects
across titles are not particularly surprising. The important implication this particular assumption
delivers is that each consumer, after solving her appropriate dynamic policy for hardware purchase,
can solve an independent optimal stopping problem for each individual piece of software. Further-
more, even if there exist some minor cross-title effects between certain titles, they are unlikely to
affect demand estimates significantly or change any of the results in the counterfactual exercises
conducted later in this paper.36
In 3.3, I develop the estimation and associated computational routine. Those not interested in
details may skip ahead to 3.4 where identification of the model is discussed, or to section 4 where
35For software released between 1998-2000 on Sony’s original Playstation console, Nair (2007) shows cross-price
effects across games to be low (even when accounting for strategic release timing on the part of game developers),
consumers do not seem to exhibit intertemporal substitution within genres, entry by hit games do not have a significant
effect on sales or prices of games within a genre, and rates at which game prices fall are independent of competitive
conditions within the market.
36As will be evident, only the contracting decisions for “hit” titles (those of sufficiently high quality) significantly
affect platform market shares. Such titles have significant market power and are the least likely to be affected by any
potential competition from other titles.
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results from the demand estimation are presented.
3.1 Demand Estimation in Platform Markets
Assume there are J hardware platforms and K software products available in a given market, where
J and K will refer to both the set and number of each respective product. Let Kj represent the
set of software available on platform j. A consumer can only utilize a software product k ∈ Kj
if she first purchases platform j.37 For now, assume consumers may only purchase one hardware
platform and the environment exists only for one period in order to abstract away from dynamic
concerns. The timing of actions is as follows:
Stage I: Consumers may choose to purchase any hardware platform j ∈ J .
Stage II: If consumer i has chosen platform j, she may purchase any subset of products
Ki,j ⊂ Kj
I focus on the problem of estimating a demand system for consumer behavior observed in stages
I and II. I assume the econometrician observes the aggregate share of each hardware platform chosen
in Stage I and share of consumers on each platform who buy each piece of software in Stage II. In
this platform setting, there are two primary issues that a demand system must capture:
i. Platform utility is endogenous and a function of affiliated products Kj : a consumer derives
utility from purchasing a particular piece of software, and this must be accounted for in the
utility she expects to derive from adoption of the platform. Any parameters that enters into
the specification of utility of both software and hardware – e.g., price sensitivity – should be
consistent and jointly estimated. Furthermore, a consumer’s utility upon joining a platform
can only be a function only of those products affiliated with that platform, and the choice set
over software products changes depending on which platform she joins.
ii. Consumers select across platforms according to their preferences and characteristics: failing
to account for either heterogeneity in consumer preferences or their selection across platforms
will lead to biased estimates of the quality and contribution of a piece of software to consumer
utility, since those onboard the platform have already exhibited their preference for those
goods affiliated. Consequently, any model which implies consumers who purchase and those
who do not are identical is likely misspecified. Nonetheless, this is often the assumption made
when estimating software demand without also explicitly accounting for hardware demand.38
37Each software title k may be available on multiple platforms – i.e., Kj ∩Kj′ , j 6= j′ need not be empty. As long
as the econometrician can distinguish from which platform a purchaser of k owns – which is the case in this paper –
the following discussion does not change.
38To preview later discussion, the second issue is amplified when demand is dynamic since there is an additional
dimensionality of selection over time. In many hardware-software industries, early adopters tend to be those who
exhibit high values for software or low price sensitivity. Without heterogeneity, the characteristics of outside consumers
(non-purchasers) do not change over time, and any model would have difficulty rationalizing improving product quality
and declining prices with falling shares of observed purchasers.
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I have not yet explicitly specified when Kj is determined. It may be the case that all software
products join a platform prior Stage I, all join immediately before Stage II but following Stage I, or
some join before Stage I and others before Stage II. In the case whereby consumers perfectly observe
the set of software products available on each platformKj and perfectly know their utility over each
software product prior to platform adoption in Stage I, then there is no need to separate out the
consumer’s decision into these two stages: consumers essentially choose “bundles” of both hardware
and software simultaneously, and thus any discrete choice demand framework over properly specified
bundles of goods would be adequate.39 Yet, in many environments consumers do not have complete
information about either the identity of software products available, or the utility they derive from
them.40 Insofar there is consumer uncertainty about software quality or availability prior to Stage
I which is only resolved after the platform has been chosen, then there is a need to link software
demand following the realization of uncertainty with the ex ante expected utility from software in
hardware demand. For now, I assume Kj is exogenously given.41
Previous work on estimating demand in platform markets have usually taken one of two ap-
proaches: (i) estimate only one side of the market (typically the hardware side) using a reduced
form approximation for the contribution of utility of the other side (which usually is the number
of complementary products available);42 (ii) estimate each side in a separate two-stage procedure,
combining the software estimates in the first stage to construct a measure for hardware utility. Lim-
itations of the first approach are numerous, notably its inability to estimate the entire structure of
demand for a given market and to conduct counterfactual experiments in which contracting part-
ners change. Furthermore, a “killer-application” developed for a hardware system or world-class
cancer treatment center as part of an HMO group are not replaceable by a handful of mediocre
titles or mid-tier hospitals; yet this is the equivalence suggested by an assumption relating only the
number of products available to software quality. Failing to account for heterogeneity across firms
and software titles precludes any hope of estimating their marginal contribution to a platform.
The second approach – a two-stage procedure – can yield reasonable results only if the econome-
trician observes all characteristics of consumers onboard each platform that influence their demand
for software. Not only are the data requirements far more intensive, but this also rules out the
possibility for controlling for selection on any unobservable characteristics. This problem is exac-
erbated once multiple periods are introduced, since a two-stage estimation procedure also cannot
39If there is uncertainty only over the utility derived from the platform itself – and not from software – then
demand can be estimated in this manner as well. Such platform-only uncertainty may come from the consumer’s own
idiosyncratic preferences or the actions of other consumers. E.g., consumers may realize certain needs subsequent to
platform adoption or can derive utility from the adoption decisions of other consumers (network effects).
40An example of this latter phenomenon would be that consumers do not know exactly the illness(es) that may
beset them until after they join an HMO and become sick; consequently, since the utility from a hospital on an HMO
plan is contingent on the type of illness acquired, consumers can only form expectations over the utility an HMO’s
hospital network provides (Ho (2006)). In this setting, the uncertainty will be from the dynamic setting and the
durability of the hardware platform: consumers do not know for certain what software titles will be available in the
future.
41Endogenizing the set of software products onboard each platform is the focus of section 5.
42See, e.g., Song and Chintagunta (2003) for PDAs; and Clements and Ohashi (2005), Prieger and Hu (2006), and
Corts and Lederman (2007) in videogames.
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consistently handle the dynamic evolution and selection of consumer heterogeneity across platforms.
Simultaneous Estimation
The tight integration between hardware and software demand suggests moving towards a method
which can simultaneously estimate both sides at once. For expositional purposes, I adopt a dis-
crete choice based approach to demand estimation (see e.g. Lancaster (1971), McFadden (1973),
Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)). These later models can allow consumer
preferences for product characteristics to vary as a function of observed and unobserved individual
characteristics, and thus allow for reasonable substitution patterns across goods.
Let the total expected lifetime utility that a consumer derives from a single platform be given
by
U(ψi, xj , ξj ,Γj(·); θ)
where ψi is a vector of individual characteristics and preferences, xj and ξj are observable and un-
observable (to the econometrician) product characteristics respectively (where prices are included
in xj), and Γj(·), which may also be a function of individual preferences and characteristics, rep-
resents the total expected utility a consumer derives from purchasing and using software available
on platform j.43 As mentioned before, so that the choice of optimal bundle of software cannot be
collapsed into the hardware purchase decision (which may be conceivable in a static environment,
but not so in a dynamic environment studied later), I assume that there is some uncertainty over
software quality or availability that is resolved only after the hardware is purchased. θ is a vec-
tor of parameters to be estimated, which includes any parameters governing the distribution of
unobserved consumer characteristics and preferences.
A consumer will purchase the platform that maximizes her utility, and thus will chose j if and
only if:
U(ψi, xj , ξj ,Γj(·); θ) ≥ U(ψi, xr, ξr,Γr(·); θ) ∀ r ∈ J ∪ {0}
where j = {0} represents the “outside option” of non purchase. Let
Aj = {ψ : U(ψi, xj , ξj ,Γj(·); θ) ≥ U(ψi, xr, ξr,Γr(·); θ) ∀ r ∈ J ∪ {0}}
denote the set of values for ψ which induce consumers to choose good j. If P0(dψ) denotes the
(initial) population density of ψ, then the share of consumers who choose platform j is given by
sj(xj , ξj ,Γ(·); θ) =
∫
ψ∈Aj
P0(dψ) (1)
With the exception of Γj(·), the hardware adoption model and aggregation is no different than
previous discrete choice demand models. However, as noted earlier, Γ(·) is endogenous and comes
43I am implicitly assuming total software utility enters linearly into a consumer’s calculation of hardware utility,
so that the expected utility of software Γj(·) is a sufficient statistic for computing the expected lifetime utility from
hardware.
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from the software side of the market.
To define Γ(·), it becomes necessary to examine the utility a consumer receives from each
software title. Consider a consumer who has purchased platform j, and now decides which subsect
of software titles Kj ∈ Kj to purchase. For expositional purposes, assume that each software
product is in an independent market such that there are no substitution or complementarities
across titles.44 Thus, a consumer can decide whether or not to buy a particular title in isolation,
and will purchase a given title if that title yields higher utility U sw than the outside good:
U sw(ψi, wk, ηk; θ) ≥ U sw(ψi, w0, η0; θ)
where now wk and ηk are the observable and unobservable characteristics of title k. Although the
set of consumer types Ak who purchase good k is defined similarly as on the hardware adoption
side,
Ak = {ψ : U sw(ψi, wk, ηk; θ) ≥ U sw(ψi, w0, η0; θ)}
the share on platform j of consumers who choose k is given by
sk(wk, ηk; θ) =
∫
ψ∈Aj∩Ak
P0(dψ) (2)
where now the bounds of integration are over the intersection Aj ∩ Ak. This reflects the fact that
consumers who purchased platform j are a selected subsample of the entire population, and it are
only these consumers who must be considered when analyzing software demand; this is precisely the
selection issue brought up earlier. With independent software titles, software utility on platform
j will simply be the maximum utility derived by purchasing or not purchasing each particular
software title:
Γj(·) = E[
∑
k∈Kj
max{U sw(ψi, wk, ηk; θ), U sw(ψi, w0, η0; θ)}]
with the expectation possibly being over both the set of products Kj as well as individual product
utilities U sw(·).
For a given parameter vector θ, most of the established estimation algorithms require the
computation of shares {sj(·; θ)}∀j and {sk(·; θ)}∀k∈Kj ,∀j : e.g, they are used in the likelihood function
for MLE, or are required to recover unobservable characteristics ξ and η from which moments may
be constructed (as in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)). But to do so, the aforementioned
endogeneity and selection problem must be solved. Without knowing the distribution of consumer
types who select a given platform, calculating the share of consumers who purchase a particular
software title is impossible; at the same time, computation of the distribution of consumer types
who select a given platform requires knowledge of software quality, which itself is predicted from
market shares derived from the software adoption side. More formally, for a given θ, the share of
44If there were complementarities or substitutability, the model can be extended simply to a consumer choosing
the optimal bundle of software titles.
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consumers who purchase platform j given by (1) cannot be computed without first knowing Γj(·);
however, computation of Γj will require calculation of the utility of each software title on platform
j, which in turn requires knowledge of the distribution of consumers who have selected platform j
(i.e., the limits of integration in (2)).
This paper introduces a nested fixed point routine to solve this particular issue, discussed in
further detail in 3.3. I first fix the distribution of consumer types onboard each platform, and
obtain a first-step estimate of the fraction of consumers who purchase each title. This allows
for the construction of a first-step estimate of total software quality for each platform. I then
update the distribution of consumer types onboard each platform using the new estimated software
quality. This procedure is repeated, iterating between estimating hardware adoption (updating the
distribution of consumer types) and software adoption (updating the quality of software onboard
each platform) until convergence, which occurs when predicted values from the hardware side are
consistent with predicted values on the software side.
3.2 Dynamic Model of Consumer Demand
Although the previous discussion illustrated the importance of jointly estimating hardware and
software demand and controlling for the selection of heterogenous consumers across platforms, it did
so in a static one-period environment. In many applications including the one examined here, this
is unrealistic. In the videogame industry, consumers internalize future software availability, quality
differences, and potential price drops when deciding when and whether or not to purchase either
a hardware system or software title. There is also a clear interdependence of demand across time.
First, since videogame consoles and software are durable goods, consumers who have purchased a
particular console or title in the past will no consider purchasing the same goods in the future, and
the potential market size for a given product will thus shrink over time. Furthermore, the types
of consumers who purchase earlier will be different that those who purchase later: just as there is
selection across platforms, there is also selection across time – e.g., early adopters will tend to be less
price sensitive or demonstrate a higher degree of affinity for these products. Controlling for these
dynamic issues is crucial in accurately estimating demand in this and most platform environments.
I begin by modifying the notation sofar introduced to be time-specific. Now, in each period
t, there are Jt hardware consoles and Kj,t software titles on each platform available for purchase.
Each consumer who has not yet purchased a console before time t may choose to do so, or wait
until the next period. In addition, any consumer who has purchased a console by time t may decide
to purchase any software title k ∈ Kj,t she has not yet already purchased, where Kj,t represents
the set of software titles available on platform j at time t. Since hardware and software are durable
goods, and consumers have expectations over the evolution of these goods’ qualities and prices, the
timing of purchase becomes a dynamic optimization problem – not only which product should a
consumer purchase, but also when should she purchase.
I will first describe the consumer hardware adoption decision before moving on to discussing
software adoption. For expositional purposes, I introduce a model whereby consumers may only
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purchase one hardware console before extending it to allow consumers to purchase multiple consoles.
Hardware Adoption
At any period of time, consumers who have not yet purchased a hardware platform may choose to
do so. The total lifetime (expected) utility of consumer i who purchases platform j at time t is
given by:
uijt = αxi xj,t − αpi ln(pj,t) + Γj,t(αpi , αγi ) + ξj,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
δijt
+²ijt (3)
where xj,t are observable characteristics of platform j at time t (which include a platform-specific
and monthly fixed effects, age, age squared, and the current platform installed base), pj,t is the price
of the console, Γj,t is the expected present-discounted value of being able to purchase software for the
platform in the current and future periods, ξj,t is a product characteristic observable to the consumer
but not to the econometrician, and ²ijt is an individual-platform-time specific component which
represents idiosyncratic consumer heterogeneity unobservable to the econometrician but realized by
the consumer only at time t. Additionally, {αx, αpi , αγi } are (possibly individual specific) coefficients
which reflect how intensely a consumer prefers platform characteristics, price, and software. The
actual functional form of Γj,t(·) emerges from the software adoption portion of the model which
will be described in the next subsection; the only restriction made on Γ here is that it differs across
agents only as a function of their income and software preference coefficient {αpi , αγi }, and enters
linearly into the utility specification. Finally, I denote the portion of product’s individual specific
utility net the individual-specific unobservable by δi,j,t; it can be thought of as the price-adjusted
quality for platform j, and if ²i,j,t were mean zero, it would represent the mean utility of such a
purchase. Instead of purchasing a console, a consumer also may choose to wait and consume the
outside good for one period – which yields utility ui0t = ²i0t – and return to the market in the next
period.
In each period, a consumer chooses her optimal action – buy today or wait until next period –
given her preferences, current product qualities, prices and software availability, and expectations
over the evolution of these characteristics. A consumer’s utility from being on the market for a
hardware platform – contingent on following the optimal policy – is given by the following value
function:
Vi(²i,t,Ωi,t) = max{max
j
uijt, ui,0,t + βE[Vi(²i,t+1,Ωi,t+1]} (4)
where Ωi,t includes current product attributes as well as the time of year (in order to account for
seasonality effects) and any other market characteristics which may affect firm product pricing,
entry, exit, or attributes such as installed base. In general, it includes all variables at time t in the
consumer’s information set which affect her utility or value for waiting. This value function defines
an optimal stopping problem which specifies when a consumer should (if ever) purchase a console.
For tractability, I first impose the following assumption on the idiosyncratic utility shocks:
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Assumption 3.1. {²i,t}∀i,t are independently and identically distributed type 1 extreme value with
variance normalized to pi2/6.
Whereas the normalization of the variance pins down the scale of utility (which is itself not iden-
tified), the distributional and conditional independence assumption allows (4) to be analytically
integrated over ² and provide an “expected” value function (EV ) for consumer i as a function of
current state variables:
EVi(Ωi,t) =
∫
²i,t
Vi(²i,t,Ωi,t)dP² = ln(exp{δit}+ exp{βE[EVi(Ωi,t+1)]}) (5)
where
δi,t ≡ Eεt{max
j
ui,j,t} = ln(
∑
j∈Jt
exp(δi,j,t))
and represents the expected utility from purchasing a product which delivers the maximal utility
at time t.45 Also known as the “inclusive value” for consumer i, δi,t is a sufficient statistic for
determining if the consumer will participate in the market at time t by purchasing any hardware
platform.
Despite reframing the value function in expectations as in (5), the state space is still too large
for the consumer’s optimization problem to be computationally solvable. One solution, utilized by
Melnikov (2001), Hendel and Nevo (2006) and Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2007), is to assume that
the inclusive values (δi,t) within a market follow a first-order Markov process. However, although
significantly reducing the computational burden of estimation, this assumption nonetheless imposes
strong restrictions on the nature of industry competition and evolution.46 Rather than follow this
approach, I instead assume that consumers perceive the mean utilities δi,j,t for each console to
evolve according to an exogenous first-order process, and depends on previous values of itself in
addition to {δi,j′,t}j′ 6=j of all other competing hardware platforms, as well as the time of year:
Assumption 3.2. (Consumers perceive that) {δi,j,t}j∈Jt can be summarized by an exogenous first-
order Markov Process:
F ({δi,j,t+1}j∈Jt+1 |Ωi,t) = Fi({δi,j,t+1}j∈Jt+1 |{δi,j,t}j∈Jt ,m(t)) (6)
where m(t) represents the month at time t.
In addition to allowing each individual i to have different expectations over the evolution of the
industry (Fi being individual specific), this specification is more general by allowing each product’s
“quality” to evolve and as a function of – among other things – the proximity of other products’
quality to its own. Furthermore, which is crucial for this industry, any monthly seasonality is
45Ben-Akiva (1973) shows that E²[maxi{xi + ²i}|xi] = ln(∑i exp(xi)) when {²i} are i.i.d. extreme value type 1.
Application of this twice provides (5). See Rust (1987) and Melnikov (2001) for use of this in a similar context.
46E.g., the inclusive value for a consumer δi,t may be high if there are several products with low prices or relatively
few products with high prices; a consumer would not only exhibit the same probability of purchasing but also have
the same expectation over future values of δi,t in both cases.
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captured as a state variable. However, this assumption is still problematic in that it is difficult
to create a supply model which generates first-order processes in δi,j,t, which includes prices and
software title availability.47 At the same time, as noted in Hendel and Nevo (2006), such first order
processes are reasonable approximations to consumer expectations and memory as consumers may
remember prices and software availability from only their previous visit. Higher order processes
not only may be too burdensome for estimation, but for consumer decision making as well.
Combining equations (5) with assumption (6), the consumer’s expected value function can now
be rewritten as:
EVi({δi,j,t}j∈Jt ,m(t)) = ln(exp(δi,t) + exp(βE[EVi({δi,j,t+1}j∈Jt ,m(t+ 1))|{δi,j,t}j∈Jt ,m(t)])) (7)
where now the state space has been drastically reduced from |Ωi,t| to one of only at most J + 1-
dimensions. Due to the limited number of platforms in the videogame industry (only 3 in the time
period analyzed), this state space is now small enough for implementation.
Software Adoption
I now turn to analyze the software purchase decisions for a consumer, used to construct the “software
quality” function {Γj,t(·)}∀j,t in (3).
In each period t, a consumer who has purchased platform j in any period τ ≤ t enters the market
and may purchase any software title k ∈ Kj,t she has not yet purchased. Crucially, I assume each
consumer views each software title as a separate market – i.e., the decision to purchase a title k
is independent of purchasing k′ 6= k. Although this assumption is motivated by feasibility,48 it
does not seem to be overly restrictive in this particular industry for reasons discussed earlier. For
expositional purposes, the remainder of this subsection omits the j subscript for the platform and,
unless otherwise specified, values are assumed to be platform specific.
A consumer’s expected lifetime utility from buying title k in period t (provided she already
owns the platform) is given by:
vi,k,t = α˜
γ
i + α˜
wwk,t + η˜k,t − αpi ln(pk,t) + ²˜ikt (8)
where wk,t are observable software characteristics (which include a game-specific fixed effect, monthly
fixed effects, as well as age, age squared, and the current installed base of previous purchasers), η˜k,t
is an software characteristic unobservable to the econometrician (but observable to the consumer),
pk,t the price, and ²˜ikt is an individual-software-time specific utility shock. α˜
γ
i is an individual spe-
47Setting aside dynamic issues due to the evolving nature of the installed and remaining customer base, there is
a strong parallel to the industry dynamics model introduced in Pakes and McGuire (1994) and Ericson and Pakes
(1995): if δi,j,t represented platform j’s “index of efficiency” and platforms could engage in investment efforts to
improve this value, then under certain assumptions (including the absence of other strategic control variables) there
would exist a Markov-Perfect Nash equilibrium whereby {δi,j,t}∀j would evolve according to a first-order transition
kernel.
48In a dynamic environment, individually tracking each consumer’s inventory and subsequent choice set is too
computationally burdensome. Such problems were absent in the static environment used for exposition in Section II.
21
cific preference for “gaming” reflected in the increase in utility of any particular piece of software,
and αpi reflects price sensitivity, and importantly is the same coefficient as on the hardware side. A
consumer can also decide not to buy a piece of software at time t and return to the market in the
next period, yielding the outside option utility vik0t = ²˜ik0t.
Mirroring the hardware side, I make a distributional assumption on the individual-specific utility
shocks:
Assumption 3.3. {²˜i,k,t, ²˜i,k0,t}∀i,k,t are independently and identically distributed extreme value
type 1 with variance σ2²pi
2/6.
Here I allow for the variance of unobserved heterogeneity – σ² – to vary between the hardware
and software sides. I must account for this when combining measures of utility across sides as any
shared coefficients (e.g., αpi ) need to be appropriately scaled.
49 I thus re-express the software utility
in (8) by multiplying and dividing through by σ²:
vi,k,t = σ²(α
γ
i + α
wwk,t + ηk,t − αp,swi ln(pk,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ζikt
+²ikt)
where {αγi , αw, αp,swi , ηk,t, ²i,k,t} = {α˜γi , α˜w, αpi , η˜k,t, ²˜i,k,t}/σ², and ζi,k,t represents the (scaled) utility
of purchasing a piece of software net of individual-specific-unobservable ²i,k,t, and may also be
referred to as the price-adjusted quality or mean-utility for software k. To prevent confusion, I will
use αp,hwi ≡ αpi to refer to the coefficient on price used on the hardware side whenever appropriate.
A consumer’s optimal stopping problem for when (if ever) to purchase software title k is given
by:
Wi(Ωk,t, ²ikt) = max{vikt(ωk,t, vik0t + βE[Wi(Ωk,t+1, ²i,k,t+1)]}
where now Ωk,t represents any relevant variables which influence consumer i’s utility from purchas-
ing or waiting for title k. Again, to reduce the dimensionality of the state space, the following
assumption is made on the evolution of each software-title’s mean-utility:
Assumption 3.4. (Consumers perceive that) ζikt can be summarized by an exogenous first-order
Markov process:
G(ζi,k,t+1|Ωk,t) = Gi,j(ζi,k,t+1|ζikt,m(t)) (9)
where now Gi,j is allowed to be specific to individual i and console j. It is, however, not title
specific, and thus all software titles on a given platform are perceived by consumers to follow
the same evolutionary path contingent on their price-adjusted quality and time of year. This
assumption is subject to the same caveats and support as provided earlier.
Given assumptions 3.3 and 3.4, the expected value function of being in market for software title
k at time t can be re-expressed as
EWi(ζikt) =
∫
²i,k,t
Wi(ζi,k,t, ²i,k,t)dP² = σ² ln(exp(ζikt) + exp(βE[EWi(ζikt+1)|ζikt]))
49C.f. Train (2003), chapter 2 for further discussion.
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which imbeds consumer i’s expectations over future prices and characteristics for software k.
To close the software adoption side, I need to link Γj,t to the value of being on the market for
software on platform j. This “total software utility” on platform j can be separated into two parts:
(i) the utility from software available in the present period, and (ii) the utility from new software
that will arrive in future periods. Let this latter value be denoted Λj,t(α
p
i , α
γ
i ), and let K
R
j,t denote
the set of software titles released on platform j at time t. Then Γj,t is given by:
Γj,t(α
p
i , α
γ
i ) =
 ∑
k∈{⋃τ≤tKRj,τ}
EWikt(ζi,k,t)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Current Software Utility
+ Λj,t(α
p
i , α
γ
i )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(Expected) Future Software Utility
(10)
where the first term aggregates the expected utility of being on the market for each piece of software
currently available; it imbeds the consumer’s optimal policy in its calculation.
Although all three consoles survived to the end of observed time period, other consoles in
previous generations have prematurely “died” and left the market. To allow for this uncertainty, I
allow consumers to believe a console will continue to have software released in the next period with
probability βγ , constant across time and consoles. Conditional on βγ , if a consumer had perfect
information over all future titles that would be released in addition to the terminal date T , future
utility would be specified by
Λ˜i,j,t =
T∑
τ=1
(βγ × β)τ
 ∑
k∈KRj,t+τ
EWi,k,t+τ (ζi,k,t+τ )
 (11)
A consumer does not know exactly the number nor quality of future titles, however. I deal with this
by assuming consumers have rational expectations consistent with the observed data, and condition
on current observed market variables and product characteristics; i.e., Λi,j,t = E[Λ˜i,j,t|Ωt, βγ ]. In
estimation, as will be described in the next section, I will use a nonparametric series regression
of (11) on console characteristics and software availability as an approximation to proxy for a
consumer’s expectations.
In the appendix, I discuss an alternative formulation for future software utility whereby con-
sumers believe the number and quality of titles released in each period are drawn independently
from estimated distributions consistent with the data.
Multiple Hardware Purchases
When consumers are allowed to multihome and purchase multiple consoles, both the dynamic
optimization problem as well as the expected lifetime utility from hardware purchase changes.
First, a consumer upon purchasing a console no longer leaves the market, but retains the option
value of returning in a future period and acquiring a second or even third console. Second, the
value of a console is different if that console is the first or second (or third) purchased: the expected
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utility derived from purchasing an additional console should not include utility from a software title
the user already had access to on her original console; there may also be an additional impact on
hardware utility due to the existence of complementarities or substitution between newly purchased
and already owned consoles).
To account for multiple hardware purchases, let there now be a new state variable indicating
consumer i’s inventory of hardware consoles she already owns at time t, and represent this by
Ii,t ∈ I ≡ {0, 1}3. The expected lifetime utility from purchasing a new console now becomes a
function of which consoles a consumer already owns, and is represented by:
uijt(Ii,t) = αxi xj,t − αpi ln(pj,t) + Γj,t(αpi , αγi ; Ii,t) +D(Ii,t) + ξj,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
δijt(Ii,t)
+²ijt
where software utility Γj,t is now a function of Ii,t and is adjusted to account for the fact that a
user may have already had access to certain titles on the consoles she already owns: Γj,t is defined
as in (10), except now only includes those titles k ∈ Kj \Kj′∀j′∈Ii,t .
I also introduce a new term D(Ii,t) which reflects the complementarity or substitutability ef-
fect(s) that may exist with ownership of multiple consoles.50 Conceptually this term should be
negative, as the utility of a console would seem to decrease if another is already owned. However,
since much of this diminished utility comes from the fact that non-exclusive software titles on addi-
tional platforms were already accessible if another console was already owned, any remaining effects
should come only from other factors such as time constraints or saturation of gaming needs.51
In the appendix, I discuss how to modify a consumer’s value function (7) and assumption 3.2
on beliefs in order to integrate this new utility function into the dynamic model.
3.3 Estimation and Computation
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and following literature typically estimates discrete choice
models by recovering the set of unobserved product characteristics for any parameter vector θ which
perfectly rationalize the model’s predicted market shares with observed market shares, and then
using a generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimator based on forming conditional moments
with these unobserved characteristics: i.e., the identifying condition is typically E[ξ|z] = 0, where
z is a set of instruments orthogonal to ξ.52 However, this process requires finding appropriate
instruments for observed characteristics including price, which may not exist.
Rather than proceed in this fashion, I instead leverage the dynamic aspect of my data and
estimate based on the predicted evolution of the unobserved product characteristics. Namely, I
assume that ξ and η for each hardware system and software title evolve according to an exogenous
Markov process where the changes are independent from changes in observed characteristics.53 In
50This is similar to the additive complementarity or substitution term used in Gentzkow (2007).
51These factors are not estimated to be significant under the fully specified model when D is a constant.
52Other applications include Nevo (2001) and Petrin (2002).
53Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) (in section 4) notes the possibility of proceeding in this fashion when uti-
lizing panel data. In simultaneous work, Sweeting (2007) uses a similar assumption on the evolution of unobserved
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turn, I estimate via (conditional) maximum likelihood (ML) on the probability of observing the
changes in the error terms.
Formally, the econometrician observes the characteristics and quantities of each console and
software title in every period. Let rj denote the release date for console j and rk the release date
for software title k. From the model, the implied values of the unobserved product characteris-
tics {ξj,t}1≤j≤J,rj≤t≤T and {ηj,k,t}1≤j≤J,rk≤t≤T,k∈Kj,t can be computed to rationalize observed with
predicted market shares as a function of parameters θ to be estimated. I assume the following:
Assumption 3.5. Unobserved product characteristics for each console and software title evolve
according to a first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) process, where the errors
νhwj,t (θ) = ξj,t(θ)− ρhwξj,t−1(θ) ∀j ∈ Jt
νswj,k,t(θ) = ηj,k,t(θ)− ρswηj,k,t−1(θ) ∀j ∈ Jt, ∀ k ∈ Kj,t−1 (12)
are independent of each other and changes in all observed characteristics, and are identically dis-
tributed according to probability densities fhw(·; θ) and fsw(·; θ), respectively.54
The likelihood of observing a set of these errors is given by:
L(θ) =
J∏
j=1
 T∏
t=rj+1
fhw(νhwj,t (θ); θ)×
T∏
t=rk+1
Kj,t∏
k=1
fsw(νswj,k,t(θ); θ)

and the log-likelihood by:
L(θ) =
J∑
j=1
 T∑
t=rj+1
ln fhw(νhwj,t (θ); θ) +
T∑
t=rk+1
Kj,t∑
k=1
ln fsw(νswj,k,t(θ); θ)
 (13)
The estimate of θ0 is the θ that maximizes (13):
θˆ = supθ∈ΘL(θ) (14)
The initial values for {ξj,rj}∀jand {ηj,k,rk}∀j,k are conditioned on in the specification of the
likelihood. However, as T grows large, the contribution of these initial values to the likelihood
grow negligible. Provided |ρ| < 1, the exact ML estimator and this conditional ML estimator
which omits the first ξj,rj and ηj,k,rk term will have the same asymptotic distribution.
55 Leveraging
the dynamic aspects of the problem in this fashion not only allows us to condition for an initial
conditions problem,56 but it proves robust to the possibility that hardware and software release
characteristics within a GMM estimator.
54The stationarity coefficients (ρhw, ρsw) ∈ θ and need to be estimated as well. Since the drift of a MA(1) process
is not separately identified from the level of product fixed effects contained within the αx and αy coefficients, it is
fixed to be 0.
55See e.g. Fuller (1996); the estimator is also similar to the “y0-conditional estimator” described in section 8.7 of
Hayashi (2000).
56I.e., the initial values of ξ or η upon release may be correlated with product observable characteristics.
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dates are “timed”: e.g., titles that have a relatively high initial unobserved quality ηj,k,rk may
systematically be released during “high” demand months, such as the beginning of summer and
during the holiday season.57 As long as its evolution continues to follow (12), any such strategic
timing will not bias estimates.
The following proposition proves this estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal.
Proposition 3.6. Let nhwj =
∑T
t=rj
1 and nswj =
∑T
t=rk
∑Kj,t
k=1 1 be the number of observations for
platform j, and N =
∑J
j=1(n
hw
j + n
sw
j ) be the total number of error observations. Provided certain
identifying and invertibility assumptions are satisfied (see assumption C.1 in Appendix), if θˆ is a
solution to (14), then as T →∞, µhwj = nhwj /N and µswj = nswj /N constant,
I. θˆ →p θ0
II.
√
N(θˆ − θ0)→d N(0,J−10 ), where
J0 =
 J∑
j=1
µhwj E
(
∂ ln fhw
∂θr
∂ ln fhw
∂θs
)∣∣∣∣
θ=θ0
+ µswj E
(
∂ ln fsw
∂θr
∂ ln f sw
∂θs
)∣∣∣∣
θ=θ0
 (15)
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof requires modifying the standard asymptotic arguments for maximum likelihood es-
timators (e.g., Rao (1973)) by accounting for the non-identical distribution of the hardware and
software errors in addition to the varying number of observations across platforms and time. For
estimation, I will assume that the errors are normally distributed with νhwj,t ∼ N(0, σ2hw) and
νswj,k,t ∼ N(0, σ2sw).
Note also ξ and η cannot be computed exactly, but rather only approximately, due to both
population sampling error and the need to simulate the integrals defining market shares for each
product.58 As in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), I assume the population sampling is negligible
due to the large sample size of over 100M U.S. households. However, the issues introduced with
the need for simulation cannot be ignored. As has well been documented, simulation error is
problematic in these contexts when market shares are small (Berry, Linton, and Pakes (2004)), and
it also introduces a bias due to the non-linearity of the log transformation in the maximum likelihood
estimator (Lee (1995)). To avoid the problems involved with simulation error, I instead discretize
the distributions of consumer heterogeneity and assume consumers belong to one of several “types”
of consumers with identical {αγi , αpi } coefficients (but with different realizations of {²it}).
To calculate standard errors, I use the estimate θˆ and take the sample analogue of (15).
Parameters to Estimate
Let θ1 = {ρhw, ρsw, α˜p,sw0 , σp,sw, σγ , σ², βγ , D} and θ2 = {αx, αw}. The parameters to be estimated
are θ = {θ1, θ2}.
57See Einav (2007) for issues regarding seasonality and timing in the US Motion Picture Industry.
58These are provided by equations (26) and (31) in the appendix.
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Computation
Here I overview the procedure of recovering the unobserved product characteristics {ξj,t(·)}∀j,t
and {ηj,k,t(·)}∀j,k,t as a function of the parameter vector θ. Once these values are obtained, the
log-likelihood function in (13) can be computed.
The approach for recovering the unobservable utility components ξ in the hardware side and
η in the software side is similar to the approaches utilized in Nair (2007) and Gowrisankaran and
Rysman (2007), which both in turn nest the methodologies of Rust (1987), Berry (1994), and
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). This paper, however, links these two demand systems and
estimates both sides simultaneously; additionally, in allowing each platform’s mean utility to evolve
separately from the inclusive value of the industry and explicitly accounting for seasonality effects,
the specification here is more general.
For any given θ parameter, we first assume starting values for {Γj,t}∀j,t, which can either be
fixed (e.g., at 0), or can be computed by assuming that the distribution of consumer heterogeneity
across new console purchasers is stationary and first estimating the software side. I employ the latter
approach. Utilizing these initial values for Γ0, I first proceed with estimating the hardware adoption
side. The “mean” utility δj,t for each platform that rationalizes predicted market shares to observed
market shares is found via an iterative contraction mapping introduced in Berry, Levinsohn, and
Pakes (1995). For each iteration of this contraction mapping, each consumer’s belief process over
the evolution of δi,j,t for every inventory state ι is updated according to the regression
Fi(δi,j,t+1(ι)|{δi,j,t(ι)}∀j , ι,m(t)) = (16)
ϕi,j,ι,0 +
3∑
j′=1
ϕi,j′,ι,1δi,j′,t(ι) +
11∑
m=1
ϕi,j,ι,m+3χm(t) + υi,j,ι,t
(whereby χm(t) are indicator variables if t is in month m) and her optimal stopping problem is
solved to determine the probability of purchase.59 At each point in time, the number and identity
of consumers at each inventory state evolves according to (30), which at the end is aggregated
across consumers to form predicted market shares for each month.
Once the hardware adoption side is solved for a given vector of {Γj,t(ι)}∀j,t,ι, I use the probability
that each consumer adopts a hardware platform in each period to form the consumer distribution
of each hardware’s installed base, denoted by {dPj,t(αp, αγ)}∀j,t. This updated distribution of
consumer types is then used to estimate the software adoption decision, which proceeds via a
similar nested framework as the hardware side except that it now must be done for each console
separately. I.e., the same “δ”-contraction mapping is used to recover the mean utilities ζj,k,t for
each piece of software on a given console, whereby in each iteration consumer expectations are
59Unlike using more lagged terms, which would increase the state space and be too computationally expensive, the
functional form can be expanded to utilize higher order terms and/or interactions between δj,t and its competitors
{δj′,t}∀j′ 6=j .
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updated according to
Gij(ζi,k,t+1|ζi,k,t) = ϕji0 + ϕji,1ζi,k,t + ϕji,2(ζi,k,t)2 +
11∑
m=1
ϕji,m+2χm(t) + υ
j
i,k,t (17)
and the consumer’s optimal stopping problem is solved. After the ζ’s converge for a given prob-
ability distribution dP (αp, αγ), an updated value of Γj,t(·), given by (10), is computed for every
inventory state. Future utility in Γj,t(·) is obtained via a non-parametric series regression on (11)
using third-order terms and a full set of interactions on a console’s age, number of active software
titles, and month dummies.
Finally, this updated value of Γj,t(·) is fed back and the hardware adoption side is re-estimated.
The procedure iterates between estimating the hardware and software sides until Γj,t(·) and Pj,t
converge, at which point ξ and η can be recovered from the final computed values δj,t and ζj,k,t via
a linear regression (at which point θ2 can be “concentrated” out). A non-derivative based Nelder
and Mead (1965) simplex algorithm is used to search for θˆ1.60
The procedure is illustrated in figure 2 with further details provided in Appendix A.3. With
an appropriately fine grid and large enough bounds on the state spaces and following an initial
calibration period, no problems with convergence for δj,t, ζj,k,t, EVi, EWi, or Γj,t were encountered
during estimation.
3.4 Identification
As in estimation of most dynamic processes, without further restrictions on the discount factor and
parameterization of consumer heterogeneity, the model remains unidentified (Rust (1994), Magnac
and Thesmar (2002)). I fix the discount rate β at .99. To parameterize consumer heterogeneity,
price sensitivity for hardware and software takes the form αp,·i = α
p,·
0 −σp,·yi where yi is consumer i’s
annual household income, and αp,·0 and σp,· are parameters to be estimated. As in Berry, Levinsohn,
and Pakes (1995), disposable household income yi for the population is assumed to be (indepen-
dently) distributed log normally with mean and standard deviation estimated separately from the
March 2001 Current Population Survey (CPS) and draw from this distribution.61 Consumer pref-
erences for software αγ is assumed independently distributed normally with standard deviation σγ ;
since αγ enters linearly in utility, its mean is not separately identified from shifts in each software
title’s fixed effect and hence is normalized to 0.
Even with these restrictions, there still remains the question of what precisely identifies the
elements of θ. Unlike in static environments, the dynamic panel context considered here allows for
60As shown in the appendix, the non-linear search is only over θ1 as θ2 can be “concentrated” out as a function of
θ1 – i.e., the likelihood to be evaluated can be expressed as L(θ1, θ2(θ1)).
61This data reports the distribution of disposable household income in 2000, which corresponds to the start of
the data. From the Census Bureau, disposable income is defined as including money income, the value of noncash
transfers (food stamps, public or subsidized housing, and free or reduced-price school lunches), imputed realized
capital gains and losses, and imputed rate of return on home equity. It deducts imputed work expenses, federal
payroll taxes, federal and state income taxes, and property taxes on owner-occupied homes.
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the repeated observations across time of product characteristics for both hardware and software.
Consequently, the components of αx and αw – which include product and month level fixed effects
as well as age, age squared, and installed base terms – are identified from the time variation in
sales as these characteristics change.62 In a similar fashion, σ² (the ratio between software utility
and hardware utility, which affects how Γj,t enters into hardware demand) and βγ (the additional
discounting assigned to future games that have not yet been released) are identified from changes
in hardware demand in response to the release of current and future titles.
The identification of the mean and variance of the consumer heterogeneity parameters αp,·0 , σp,·, σγ
in addition to the complementarity effect D(Ii,t) requires greater discussion, especially in the ab-
sence of micro-level data. First, mean household price sensitivities αp,·0 are identified via monthly
variation in prices. Since there is very little variation in hardware prices over time (only 2 significant
price drops for each console) but far more in software prices, I estimate αp,sw0 and leverage the re-
striction imposed by the model that αp,hw0 = σ²α
p,sw
0 . I find that estimating α
p
0 and α
p,sw
0 separately
cannot reject this restriction, and thus only report estimates from the latter specification.63
Typically, the variance in consumer preferences {σp,·, σγ} can be identified from variation in
product characteristics: as characteristics change for one product, substitution to products with
similar characteristics indicate the presence of heterogeneity; on the other hand, if consumers
substitute equally to and from all goods, then consumers are likely to be more homogenous in
their preferences. Unfortunately, this argument has limited power when there are only 3 hardware
platforms in the data, and substitution away from a particular software title is limited to only the
outside good (i.e., waiting until the next period).
Nonetheless, the dynamic nature of the panel data provides another means of identification
for consumer heterogeneity: the endogenous shift in the distribution of consumer valuations over
time. In this model, consumers who are less price sensitive or have a higher intensity for gaming
will select out and adopt a platform earlier than others, creating a difference in the composition of
non-adopters and adopters of a hardware system. If household heterogeneity in either αp and αγ is
substantial, then consumer responses over time to changes in price or software availability on a given
platform versus for a given platform will be different. For example, in the absence of heterogeneity
in αγ , the release of a software title early in the life of a console that attracts 50% of a console’s
installed base should have the same effect on inducing new consumers to purchase that console as
a software title released a year later that attracts the same share: if there was no selection across
time and consumers were relatively homogenous, early adopters have the same preferences as later
adopters and the predicted software title fixed effect for both games will be the same. However, in
the presence of heterogeneity, the installed base of a console will have a higher share of consumers
with a high value of αγ earlier than later. As such, a title released later in a console’s history that
attracts the same share of consumers as a title released earlier is actually a “higher” quality title
62Although not necessary, assuming age effects are shared across hardware platforms and across software titles
further helps aid in identification. I assume monthly seasonality effects are the same across years and shared across
hardware platforms, but may differ across platforms for software demand.
63I also scale the variance of hardware price sensitivity in a similar manner: i.e., σp,hw = σ²σp,sw.
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(as reflected by a higher title-fixed effect), since being released later means it must have appealed
to a less predisposed base of users; consequently, two titles released at different times with similar
demand onboard a platform but with differential effects on total platform demand indicates the
presence of heterogeneity in gaming preferences. Similarly, heterogeneity in price sensitivity implies
that consumers onboard a console should be growing more price sensitive to software over time as
more and more price sensitive consumers purchase hardware.
Finally, I discuss the identification of the complementarity term D(Ii,t). In estimation, I assume
D(·) = D if a consumer already owns at least one other console, and D(·) = 0 otherwise. Although
possible to be more general, estimation of a single constant is sufficient to capture the possibility
that a previously purchased console reduces the future utility from another device beyond that
of reducing the number of unique titles that can be accessed.64 Since I fix the total potential
market size for video game consoles and assume it to be observable and equal to the number
of television households, identification of D comes immediately from its impact on the rate of
change in potential consumers for hardware. If D is extremely high, then any purchaser of a
hardware system essentially “leaves” the market and does not purchase another console; when D is
low, previous purchase does not remove that consumer from consideration when purchasing other
hardware devices. As the potential market size directly enters into calculation of the observed
and expected share of consumers who purchase products, the rate at which these shares change
(and its implied impact on predicted product unobservables) identifies D. It is important to stress
that even with heterogeneity, the intuition remains the same. Aiding identification is the staggered
introduction of consoles in the dataset: the PS2 was released a year earlier than the other two
systems. Thus, whereas the change in sensitivity to price or software availability on the PS2 in the
first year identifies the degree of consumer heterogeneity, whether or not these same early adopters
are still “on the market” to subsequently purchase the Xbox or GC is a function of D.
4 Demand Estimation Results
Parameter estimates from the demand system are presented in Table 3. Multiple specifications are
provided: column (i) estimates a static model without consumer heterogeneity (i.e., a standard
logit model); (ii) and (iii) introduces dynamics without heterogeneity, but differ in whether or not
consumers can singlehome or multihome; and finally, (iv) and (v) introduces consumer heterogeneity
and dynamics when, again, consumers may singlehome or multihome. Estimation of models (i)–
(iii) without any consumer heterogeneity is equivalent to estimating the hardware and software side
sequentially in two separate stages; the nested fixed point routine introduced in the previous section
to handle the selection of consumer heterogeneity is unnecessary. I will first describe demand results
under the full model (v) before comparing across specifications.
64Recall that the utility from purchasing a new hardware system contingent on already owning a different console
does not include software (both existent and forthcoming) developed for both the new and previously owned systems.
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Nonlinear Parameter Estimates
All non-linear parameters θ1 = {ρhw, ρsw, α˜p,sw0 , σp,sw, σγ , σ², βγ , D} except complementarity factor
D are estimated to be significant, including both parameters governing the variance in consumer
heterogeneity. Signs of coefficients are as expected, with utility decreasing from price and having
purchased a previous console. Regarding heterogeneity in price sensitivity, recall σp,sw is the coeffi-
cient on a consumer’s annual household income and not the standard deviation of the distribution,
which explains its small magnitude (.19× 10−5).
Heterogeneity in αγ – a consumer’s taste for software and gaming – is substantial. The estimated
value of σγ = .77 indicates that a consumer at the 80% percentile of the distribution sees a game
as 4 times cheaper than a consumer at the 20% percentile of αγ – i.e., a game selling at $50 for the
intense gamer is seen as costing $200, holding all else equal, for the less interested gamer. Thus,
it is unsurprising that most consumers at the lower end of the distribution of αγ do not purchase
a console let alone many games. Figure 3 illustrates the estimated composition of the installed
base of consumers across console by quintile of the αγ distribution. For the first two years of each
console’s existence, over half of the users are in the top quintile of the distribution of αγ ; it is not
until the end of the console’s life-cycle that consumers with lower valuations begin to make up a
significant share of users.
The ratio of the scale of the individual specific idiosyncratic error between the software and
hardware side given by σ² is close to 2. This implies that uncertainty or idiosyncracies in preferences
over a software title is twice as large as the idiosyncracies over the non-software component of a
hardware system. Although hardware is substantially a larger purchase decision in dollar value, it
has little if any stand-alone value apart from its software; thus, any idiosyncratic utility a consumer
derives from a hardware-software system is primarily contained in the consumer’s preference for
different software titles. As a result, finding σ² > 1 is not surprising.
Finally, σ² is also used to provide the ratio between mean hardware and software price sensi-
tivities (αp,hw0 = σ²α
p,sw
0 ). The implied value of α
p,hw
0 is reported at the bottom of the nonlinear
parameter estimates. For robustness, I also estimated αp,hw0 and σp,hw separately from software
parameters, and could not reject the restriction imposed by the model. Although the standard
errors on αp,hw were larger when estimated separately (due to the lack of price variation in the
hardware side), the proximity of this estimate to the value imposed by the restriction supports the
link between the hardware and software demand systems.
Linear Parameter Estimates
The bottom portion of Table 3 reports linear hardware and software parameters θ2 = {αx, αw}.
Software title fixed effects and seasonality effects are provided in the next table. The first immediate
observation is the large difference in estimated fixed effect for the PS2 as compared to its rival
platforms. Despite controlling explicitly for software, installed base, age, and seasonality effects,
the PS2 hardware unit (net price) is estimated to be 3 times as valuable as its closest hardware
competitor. Several factors included in the PS2’s fixed effect that are absent from its competitors
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include the ability to access and play the previous generation PS1’s existing library of over 1,000
games (most released prior to the introduction of PS2), the ability to play DVDs right out of the
box,65 and possibly other factors including its unique hardware specifications, design aesthetic, and
brand loyalty.
Unsurprisingly, the age of a console and software title is estimated to negatively affect lifetime
utility from purchase. With hardware, it may partially reflect the fewer periods remaining to
enjoy the console before the next generation of video game systems are released (i.e., obsolescence),
or merely some form of decay with respect to its perceived value, quality, or desirability; with
software, the latter effects seem more likely to be the reason. On the other hand, the observed
installed base of a product positively impacts utility for the Xbox and GC, but not the PS2. Recall
that the coefficient on installed base reflects how lifetime utility is affected by the observed installed
base; insofar that expectations of future installed base are correct and completely accounted for
in each product’s fixed effect, the coefficient on installed base should be 0. As a consequence, the
negative coefficient on the PS2’s installed base component may merely be a consequence that initial
estimates for the PS2’s eventual installed base were much higher than what was observed, and over
time perceptions (and hence, the utility) adjusted downwards despite an increase in the observed
installed base. Similarly, a positive coefficient for the Xbox and GC may indicate a true immediate
increase in utility from more people coming onboard a system or using a software title, or may be a
result from consumer’s revising their expectation over a product’s eventual installed base upwards
over time.
Table 4 reports month fixed effects for hardware and software. Seasonality, as expected, is
dramatic in determining when people purchase goods with highly positive and significant coefficients
on holiday months in particular.
Table 5 presents an OLS regression of recovered software title fixed effects {αwk }∀k on dummy
variables indicating whether or not the title was exclusive (and if so, if it was published by a
platform provider or not), the platform it was released on, and the month it was released. Results
show exclusive titles that are published by the platform provider (which are typically developed in-
house) tend to exhibit higher quality than average. This is highly significant across both industry
veterans – Sony and Nintendo – who have had each at least one generation of prior experience
in software development, but is not significant for new entrant Microsoft. This may be evidence
for integration as effort or quality enhancing for those firms with experience; on the other hand,
the possibility that first-party titles are selected upon before being acquired or that first-party
studios are simply higher quality game developers cannot be ruled out either. There is, however, a
significantly negative coefficient across platforms for third-party exclusive titles – that is, titles that
chose to be exclusive voluntarily. This is unsurprising: most third-party titles that were exclusive
did so not because they were compensated via some unobserved contract, but because the potential
gains from multihoming would have been outweighed by the costs of porting to more consoles.
65Although the GC could not play DVDs, the Xbox required users to purchase a separate accessory to enable
playback.
32
Fit of Model
In the appendix, I evaluate the fit of the estimated dynamic demand model, in particular focusing
on assumptions 3.2 and 3.5 which govern the evolution of hardware mean-utilities {δj,t}∀j,t and
product unobservables ξ, η. I find the parameterization of the first-order Markov process F (·) given
by (16) provides a reasonable approximation of consumer expectations, errors νhw, νsw statistically
appear to be uncorrelated and independent, and the degree of multihoming by consumers predicted
by the model is consistent with industry figures.
Alternative Specifications and Preliminary Counterfactuals
I now return to the alternate specifications listed in table 3. There are three dimensions along which
the five specifications differ: dynamics, heterogeneity, and consumer multihoming. The static spec-
ification in (i) does not allow for any dynamic considerations, which include the persistence of
unobservable characteristics, consumers leaving the market after purchase, and forward looking
agents; unsurprisingly, it has the smallest likelihood and poorest fit. For the rest of the specifica-
tions, results in the table agree on the significance and relative magnitudes for most parameters,
and are similar for most parameters in θ1 and θ2. At the same time, a standard likelihood ratio
test rejects the hypothesis that there is no consumer heterogeneity across specifications, and that
consumers can only buy one console. Where do the differences come into play? Tables 6 – 9 present
different predictions that arise from alternative specifications of the model. Here, substantive dif-
ferences emerge.
Table 6 reports own and cross-price semi-elasticities for platforms across three specifications.
Each cell reports the percent change in market share of the platform located in the column due to
a permanent 10% decrease in the price of the row-platform, where “Outside” indicates substitution
to or from the outside good.66 The full model predicts much larger differences within own market
shares following a price drop compared to estimates from other specifications – i.e., a permanent
10% price drop in the GC results in a predicted increase of 25% in total consoles sold instead of
19% – yet predicts such a price drop has a smaller impact on outside consumers. This latter effect
occurs because in static model without multihoming, most of the increase in platform market shares
from a price drop is predicted to come from consumers substituting away from the outside good
and from other consoles; the full model, however, predicts that many of the new consumers are not
substituting away from non-purchase or another console, but rather they are in fact purchasing an
additional console.
Table 7 provides software own-price semi-elasticities for a representative “hit” title on each
platform. These titles are selected since they are popular and released early in the lifetime of
each console when the selection by consumers across platforms is most severe. The most striking
difference again occurs across specifications which differ on multihoming: without multihoming, a
price drop results in a large increase in the number of consumers who purchase a title since it induces
66Since platforms are active for multiple periods, the price change is assumed to apply across the entire time period,
and market shares are computed from installed base figures at the end of the sample period (October 2005).
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more people to purchase the console; with multihoming, this effect is significantly reduced (by over
a half in the case of the Xbox and GC title) since many of those who might have purchased a console
in order to access the title (i.e., high valuation consumers) would already have been predicted to
own multiple consoles.
Table 8 presents changes in hardware installed bases if these three representative titles were
not available – i.e., this provides an idea of the elasticity of demand with respect to a hit title.67
These elasticities can be extremely large: Microsoft’s Halo, in the full model, is predicted to have
resulted in a 9% increase in the number of Xbox consoles sold (a difference of over 1.2M units).
The dynamic specifications nearly double the predicted impact of a hit title on hardware demand
vis a vis the static specification. This is not surprising: a static specification underestimates the
quality of a product since it attributes non-purchase to low quality and not to people waiting for
the price to fall. The addition of heterogeneity also impacts results: in its absence, a majority of
consumers who substitute away from a console due to the loss of a hit title become non-purchasers
of any console; however, with heterogeneity, these consumers instead are more likely predicted to
substitute to another console. This is also intuitive.68 Capturing these dynamics and predicting
where consumers substitute to and from is crucial in understanding how and why platforms compete
for exclusive software.
In an unreported specification, I also examined what would have happened if the same hit titles
for Xbox and GC had still been available on those platforms, but had also multihomed instead of
being first-party exclusives. In other words, this is the benefit Xbox and GC expected to receive
from exclusivity. The same differences across specifications was observed as before, with the static
specification predicting less of an effect and lack of heterogeneity overestimating the impact on the
outside market shares. Nonetheless, I find that Xbox and GC would have been actually better off
losing the title outright than having the title multihome – e.g., had Halo multihomed, Xbox would
have seen its predicted installed base fall by over 12% instead of 9%, mainly since PS2 would have
captured even more consumers as a result.
Finally, in table 9, I explore a “naive” counterfactual environment in which all titles are forced to
be available on all consoles, holding all other observed hardware and software prices and character-
istics fixed.69 In such an environment, the differences across specifications become the most stark.
All models without heterogeneity predict that when all titles are available on all consoles, the vast
majority of non-purchasers become video game purchasers; in a dynamic context without hetero-
geneity, the model predicts that nearly every household would then purchase a videogame console.
This is highly unrealistic – there are a significant number of consumers and households who, no mat-
67I restrict attention only to losing the particular title, and not any sequels or titles in the same franchise.
68E.g., if all consumers were the same, then those who do not purchase a console when that console lost a title
would be no different than those who elected not to purchase a console in the first place. However, with heterogeneity,
those consumers who substitute away from purchasing a console because it lost the title are already more predisposed
to gaming (since they would have purchased a console in the first place), and thus are much more likely to purchase
another console instead.
69How to extrapolate prices and qualities for a title onto consoles it was not previously released on is discussed in
the next section.
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ter what the availability of software may be, will not purchase a console due to income constraints
or extreme preferences. Introducing heterogeneity helps to correct for this out-of-sample predic-
tion, and estimates that only approximately another 20-25M consumers would purchase consoles in
the event of “forced compatibility.” Simulation runs also indicates that a model only allowing for
consumer singlehoming underestimates both the benefit the PS2 receives from forced compatibility
and the harm borne by the Xbox. Regardless of the specification, the counterfactual regime does
seem to indicate that the PS2 does significantly better with the addition of new titles; the Xbox
does significantly worse; and the GC does slightly better.
Nonetheless, this last counterfactual is hardly realistic; “forced compatibility” is not the appro-
priate regime to analyze when considering the absence of vertical integration or exclusive dealing.
The absence of these exclusive arrangements does not necessarily result in all titles multihoming
across all consoles. In such a case, some titles still may voluntarily elect to be exclusive (or just
support two consoles) since the costs of supporting more may be prohibitive. Also, it is unlikely
that the characteristics of all products would remain the same. To address these concerns, I next
focus on software provision and the decision of which platforms to support.
5 Hardware-Software Network Formation
For the consumer demand analysis, the set of software products on each platform has been con-
ditioned on in the data. However, when institutional features of an industry change – as is the
case when hardware platforms cannot vertically integrate into software provision or offer contracts
contingent on exclusivity – it is unlikely that the contracting relationships between parties will
remain the same. To account for this, in this section I develop a model of software “demand” for
hardware.
As discussed, each software title needs to be specifically developed for a particular console
in order to compatible with it. If a title has agreed to an exclusive contract or is an integrated
first-party title, the decision of which platform to support has already been made; otherwise, a third-
party title typically chooses the set of platforms that maximizes its expected profits. Each title
weighs two competing forces when deciding which platforms to support: on one hand, developing
and releasing a title for a platform provides access to that console’s base of users, which in turn
may yield greater sales; on the other hand, such development requires the outlay of (non-negligible)
“porting” costs which may or may not be recouped through these additional sales.
The estimates recovered from the demand system allow the econometrician to predict how many
copies a title would have sold had it joined any set of platforms (including ones it was not observed
to have done so), and how many more or fewer hardware consoles would have been sold as a result.
However, a software title does not know exactly how many copies it will sell for sure when it makes
its decision: unlike a consumer who can decide immediately which hardware platform or software
title to purchase, a software developer must make a decision of which consoles to support 6 – 12
months in advance of release. The challenge for the econometrician, thus, is to use estimates from
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the consumer demand system to construct estimates of each software title’s expected profits.
However, when evaluating the expected profitability of joining any set of platforms, a software
title has expectations over not only its own quality and price upon release, but also the number
of consumers that will be onboard each platform. This introduces a significant complexity: in
a platform market, a piece of software released for one platform will presumably induce more
consumers to join, which in turn may induce more titles to join, hence driving more consumer
adoption, and so on. As a consequence, every software firm must account for how other agents
will not only act, but also how they will react to the title’s own actions when it computes its own
expected profits.
Nonetheless, by leveraging similar assumptions used in the consumer demand analysis that (i)
software titles compete in independent markets and (ii) software titles perceive a sufficient statistic
for hardware demand is the set of mean-hardware utilities {δj,t}∀j,t, this particular issue can be
resolved. In particular, a software title is affected by the actions of other titles only if they affect
installed base of each console. By assumption, this can only occur through changes in {δj,t}. I
assume that each title believes it can shift the level of δj,t by deciding to join platform j, but does
not change its perception over the evolution process of δj,t from its new state as a result of its own
action. However, such beliefs over the evolution of {δj,t} are sufficient for every title to internalize
the future responses of other agents.
In the next subsection I formalize this logic and detail the construction and computation of each
software title’s expected profits. Since porting costs are unobserved, I focus on their estimation
and recovery in 5.2.
With these estimates and a means to compute the expected profits for each software title in
hand, I turn to characterizing software demand for platforms. In 5.3, I present a dynamic game
whereby all software titles are allowed to freely choose which platforms to develop for, and define
and describe how to compute an associated equilibrium for the game. Finally, in 5.4, I test the fit
of this model to the data by fixing the actions of all first-party titles, but allowing each third-party
title to re-optimize and choose a new set of platforms. I find that the outcomes predicted by the
model are very close to those realized in the data.
5.1 Software Expected Profits
Consider the decision faced by a particular software title k which will be released at time rk. Assume
τ months in advance, at time rk − τ , that title must choose a strategy sk ∈ S ≡ {{0, 1}3} which
indicates which set of platforms k will develop for. For a given strategy sk, title k’s expected dis-
counted profits are given by (where, abusing notation slightly, sk also represents the corresponding
subset of J):
E[pik(sk; θC)|Ωk,rk−τ ] = E[
( T∑
t=rk
βτ+t−rk
∑
j∈sk
Qj,k,t((1− rmkup)pj,k,t −mcj)
)
|Ωk,rk−τ ]−Ck(sk; θC)
(18)
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where Qj,k,t is the quantity of title k sold on platform j at time t, rmkup denotes the markup
captured by retailers, mcj is the marginal cost of production on console j (which includes royalties
paid to the platform provider), and Ck(sk; θC) are the “porting” costs of producing title k for all the
platforms within sk which depends on some vector of parameters θC . In addition to development
and programming costs, Ck(·) contains all other fixed costs related to the production of the game
including distribution and marketing. These porting costs are known to each software title but
not to the econometrician. Finally, expectations are conditional on Ωk,rk−τ , software title k’s
information set at time rk − τ , which includes any factors affecting market characteristics and
consumer demand.
From the demand system, Qj,k,t can be computed for any title conditional on knowing the
installed base of consumers onboard platform j at time t (who have not yet purchased k), and the
quality and price of that software title. I will assume firms share the same beliefs as consumers
over the evolution of both {δj,t}∀j,t>rk−τ and {ζj,k,t}∀j,t>rk−τ , given by processes F (·) and {Gj(·)}∀j
respectively. In turn, the expectations will be consistent with the empirical distribution of these
parameters. Essentially, this implies that a software title does not explicitly consider the strategy
choices of other titles; rather, it only does so only through how they enter and affect the mean-
utilities of each hardware console, δ. As long as title k knows the transition probabilities F (·) and
{Gj(·)}∀j , then the installed base on each platform and the mean-utility of each hardware platform
at time rk − τ , as well as the title’s own starting quality are all that are required to compute the
expected number of titles Qj,k,t sold onboard each platform. In the appendix, I further detail the
assumptions and associated computational routine required to recover these estimates.
Note that for the purposes of this analysis, platforms are not assumed to be strategic agents other
than setting the prices for their own consoles (which is internalized in the evolution of δj,t). This is
motivated by the desire to analyze an environment without exclusive deals or vertical integration;
as such, I rule out any preferential treatment by platform providers since these deals are often made
in exchange for exclusivity. Furthermore, platforms typically pre-announce and commit to royalty
rates charged to third-party software developers in advance of a system’s release.70
Finally, for estimation purposes, I will assume the retail cost margin is fixed at 35% and marginal
costs are constant across platforms at $10 (reflecting royalty rates of approximately $7 and produc-
tion costs of $3 per game disc). These figures are consistent with information provided by industry
and public sources.71
5.2 Recovery of Development and Porting Costs
In order to compute a title’s expected profits from choosing any particular action sk, one final issue
remains: development and “porting” costs Ck(·; θC) are unobserved. To estimate and recover these
unobserved costs, I proceed using techniques developed in Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2006) which
70See e.g. Kent (2001), Hagiu (2006).
71See e.g. Takahasi (2002).
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uses a methods of moments estimator based on inequality constraints.72
Consider again the decision of a third-party title k who decided τ months in advance of release
which platforms to develop for. The key assumption used to generate the moments for estimation
is that for each title observed in the data that was brought to market by a third-party publisher,
the expected profits from developing for the set of platforms it did should have been higher than
developing for any other set holding the actions fixed for all titles released up to that point in time:
Assumption 5.1. For each third-party software title k, the observed choice of platforms sok maxi-
mized its expected profits:
E[pik(sok; θC)|Ωok,rk−τ ] ≥ E[pik(s′k; θC)|Ωok,rk−τ ] ∀ s′k ∈ S
where Ωok,rk−τ denotes the observed state of each title’s information set at time rk − τ .73 Also note
that I am implicitly assuming that the choice for any title released by a third-party publisher is
made independently of any other title.
I use a parsimonious specification for Ck(sk; θC):
Ck(sk; θC) = c0(sk) +
∑
j∈sk
cjα
w
0,j,k + ν
c
k (19)
where αw0,j,k represents the mean software fixed effect for title k on platform j, estimated from the
demand side, and θC ≡ {{c0(s)}∀s∈S\{0}3 , {cj}∀j}.74 νck represents title-specific costs that affect
all strategy choices equally. The difference in costs between two different titles are thus assumed
to be contained within differences in the estimated software fixed effect and some unobservable
title-specific component.
Given assumption 5.1, the expected difference in profits across all software titles between the
observed strategy chosen and any alternative should be positive:
Ek[E[pik(sok; θC)|Ωk,rk−τ ]− E[pik(s′; θC)|Ωk,rk−τ ]] ≥ 0 ∀ s′ ∈ {S \ {0, 0, 0}}
Since I do not observe software products which are not released on any platform, I restrict attention
to strategies that involve joining at least one platform.
Let Ks denote the set of titles that choose strategy s. For each s 6= {0}3 and s′ /∈ {s ∪ {0}3},
72See Ho (2007) and Ishii (2005) for other applications of this framework. Unlike using a multinomial logit model to
determine costs based on observed actions for each software title, this procedure can handle the correlation of certain
kinds of measurement and expectational errors without needing to fully specify their joint distribution. Furthermore,
it imposes fewer assumptions than would otherwise be required.
73I will assume that the econometrician’s estimate and a title’s estimate of expected profits are the same. As long
as the error between the two is mean zero across titles and strategy choices and independent of any instruments
chosen, the following analysis does not change (this error is equivalent to the ν1 error discussed in Pakes, Porter, Ho,
and Ishii (2006)).
74In estimation, values of αw0,j,k are scaled to be within [1, 10].
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converting expectations into sample means yields the following inequality moments:
√
#Ks
#Ks
∑
k∈Ks
(Eopik(s; θC)−Eopik(s′; θC))⊗ g(ωk,t−τ ) ≥ 0 (20)
for any ωk,rk−τ ∈ Ωk,rk−τ , where ⊗ represents the Kronecker product and g(·) is any positive valued
function. I weight by the square root of the number titles that choose each particular strategy s in
order to account for the fact that there should be less expectational noise in expected profits for
strategies chosen by many titles.
For now, equation (20) defines 42 inequalities (7 non-zero strategies, each with 6 alternative
strategy comparisons) to be used in estimation. If there are multiple values of θC which satisfy
these inequalities, all are admissible and a set estimate is obtained; otherwise, the value θˆC which
minimizes the absolute value of deviations in the inequalities will be used.75
Since only strategies that involve joining at least one platform are compared, all components
in θC are not identified: only the relative differences between c0(s) and c0(s′) can be determined.
Nonetheless, for the purposes of the subsequent analysis, relative differences are all that are required
in order to determine the optimal choices for software titles. In estimation, c0({1, 0, 0}) (i.e., the
constant cost for developing only for the PS2) is fixed to be 0.
Estimates
Table 11 presents porting cost estimates for τ = 6 (i.e., software titles make their decision 6 months
prior to release). Since the costs for developing solely for the PS2 are fixed to be 0, these estimates
reflect the relative costs of porting to a particular set of consoles.
The specification reported allows costs to vary across different software genres. This is important
because certain consoles may be more difficult to develop for than others in particular genres;
similarly, higher quality games also may be more or less difficult to produce depending on the
genre. The results confirm such variation.
For the average title in all genres, magnitudes are in line with what is reasonable – developing for
two consoles is generally more expensive than developing for one, but still cheaper than developing
for all three; and developing for the Xbox and GC is cheaper than doing so for either the PS2
and GC or the Xbox and GC. Furthermore, results predict that for most titles, Xbox and GC are
to be significantly cheaper to develop for than the PS2 – this is also consistent with institutional
details.76
75When constructing the inequality estimators, I also omit “high-quality” exclusive titles brought to market by
third-party publishers, which I assume to be those with estimated fixed-effects αw0,k > −3. The reason for this
restriction is that these exclusive titles, although not first-party, may have been subject to unobserved exclusive deals
involving royalty rate reductions, lump sum payments, development assistance, or joint marketing promotions. The
underlying assumption is that all other titles – those that multihomed were or of low enough quality – did not receive
any exclusive contracts or preferential treatment from console providers. Because of the specification of costs in (19),
any title specific errors are differenced out and no selection problem is introduced.
76E.g., the PS2 with a new CPU architecture had a reputation of being difficult to develop for, whereas the Xbox
was essentially an Windows-Intel PC using APIs many developers were already familiar with.
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Repeating the exercise for different values of τ (including 9 and 12 months) did not significantly
affect estimates of porting costs, nor affected the counterfactual analysis that follows. The choice
of instruments, however, did affect point estimates and associated confidence intervals. To account
for this variation, I used several different sets of instruments and associated porting cost estimates
when computing confidence intervals for all of the following counterfactual exercises. As will be
evident, the predictions and results were still fairly robust to the choice of instruments used.
5.3 Dynamic Network Formation Game
I now present a dynamic network formation game whereby each software product prior to release
selects which platforms to develop for having formed expectations over the future profitability
of each potential strategy. The setup allows for contracting partners and consumer demand to
change over time with past actions influencing future decisions, a crucial feature to capture in this
networked industry.
Of course, other industry features may change as well, including the investment incentives which
will affect entry and exit of new hardware and software products. For the purposes of expositing
the model, I will here focus only on the changes in contracting partners, assuming that the set of
available software products is given and porting costs, royalty rates, and retailer markups do not
change. In the next section when I estimate a counterfactual regime, I discuss potential ways of
relaxing some of these restrictions.
Setup and Timing
In each period t, assume there is a set of software products KR(t) that will be released on at least
one console. At time t− τ , every title k ∈ KR(t) simultaneously commits to the set of consoles that
it will be released on τ periods in the future. This decision is private, and will not be observable
or known to any other industry participant until t. Furthermore, software participants do not have
any information about future software releases or availability KR(t′) ∀ t′ > t− τ . Finally, platforms
have no strategic actions, and royalty rates are fixed and common knowledge before any title makes
a decision.
To be clear, at each period t the timing of actions is assumed to be as follows:
1. All titles k ∈ KR(t) are released and added to the stock of existing software products;
2. All products’ characteristics (which are subsumed by δj,t, ζk,t) are determined;
3. Consumers make hardware and software adoption decisions;
4. All titles k ∈ KR(t)+τ choose which platforms to join.
I will assume title’s expected discounted profits from joining platforms j ∈ sk is given by (18).
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Equilibrium and Computation
An equilibrium of this game will be a set of strategies {sˆk}∀k and a set of Markov transition
processes F and {Gj}∀j over the evolution of {δj,t}∀j,t and {ζj,k,t}∀j,k,t such that:
1. For every k, sˆk maximizes its expected profits time rk − τ :
E[pik(sˆk; θC)|Ωk,rk−τ ] ≥ E[pik(s′k; θC)|Ωk,rk−τ ] ∀ s′k ∈ S \ {0, 0, 0}
2. Transition processes F and {Gj}∀j are consistent with realized values {δj,t}∀j,t and {ζj,k,t}∀j,k,t
implied by {sˆk}∀k.
A few comments are in order. First, F and {Gj}∀j will likely be different from the one estimated
in the demand system since a rational expectations equilibrium accounts for any changes from the
original set of contracting partners. Secondly, recall a software title does not explicitly consider the
strategy choices of other titles; rather, it only does so only through how they enter and affect the
mean-utilities of each hardware console, δ. In this regards, the equilibrium has certain similarities
with the notion of oblivious equilibrium developed by Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2007)
in Ericson and Pakes (1995)-style models, whereby agents only condition on its own state and
knowledge of the long run average industry state.
Finally, it may be the case that there are multiple equilibria: different beliefs over the evolution
of each hardware platform’s quality may sustain different actions which in turn rationalize those
beliefs. Although in computation I restrict attention to space of beliefs given by the parameteri-
zations of F and Gj used on the demand side (given by equations (16) and (17)), there still may
be multiple equilibria which satisfy the conditions given above. However, there are bounds on the
utility a consumer obtains from each platform – i.e., there is are minimum and maximum values δj
and δj for each platform which correspond to hardware mean-utilities without any software titles or
with all software titles onboard – and thus there are significant restrictions on the set of sustainable
beliefs in any equilibrium. To account for the possibility that there may still be multiple equilibria,
I run the following computation algorithm with different starting beliefs:
• I first fix the transition processes governing the evolution of δ and ζ to starting beliefs F 0 and
{G0j}∀j . For robustness, I use 5 different sets of starting beliefs F 0 which govern the evolution
of hardware qualities δ: one which assumes no software title joins any console, one which all
titles join every console, and three different sets in which all titles join only one console.
• In each iteration n, I proceed from t = 0 forward and at every period: update δnj,t for
each console based on the set of new titles released; evaluate consumer demand over the
set of hardware and software products; and compute the optimal strategy sk for each title
k ∈ Kt−τ .77 Once all periods and titles have selected a strategy, I use the implied paths of
77Despite s∗ being defined as a correspondence, in computation there is always a optimal strategy for every title.
The appendix provides details on computing expected profits.
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{δnj,t} and {ζnj,k,t} to update the transition processes according to the regressions (16) and
(17), obtain new estimates for Fn+1 and {Gn+1j }∀j , and repeat until no software title changes
its chosen action from the previous iteration and the estimated transition processes converge.
5.4 Fit of Dynamic Network Formation Model
To evaluate how well this model predicts the strategic actions of firms, I estimate an equilibrium
holding fixed the actions of all first-party software titles, and allow each third-party title to re-
optimize and choose a new set of platforms to support.
Table 12 presents a comparison between the observed data and those predicted by the new
equilibrium model. Confidence intervals are constructed by repeating the simulation using draws
from the distribution of estimated porting costs in the previous section. The model predicts both
installed base figures and market shares for each console to be very close to those observed in the
data.
Although the PS2 is predicted to have fewer titles join and the Xbox and GC more, restricting
attention to only “hit” titles – defined as titles selling over 100K or 1M copies on a given console
– indicates a much closer fit. This indicates that although the estimation error or specification
error in porting costs may likely affect the actions chosen by small titles, it becomes less of an issue
for the larger, more popular games. Since the actions of these larger titles are the only ones that
dramatically affect platform market shares, as long as their actions are accurately predicted, the
estimated aggregate industry figures such as market shares and installed base figures will be similar
to those observed.
Finally, the total number of titles sold on each platform is also provided, and again the model
predicts figures close to those given by the data. These totals are important since most of each
platform provider’s profits are derived from royalty payments on software, not from hardware sales;
they translate directly into the profitability and success of each platform.
In all simulated runs, using different starting beliefs did not change the computed equilibrium.
This is not surprising: note that the decision of which consoles to support is typically robust to
small fluctuations in beliefs over the evolution of δ. Only “high quality” titles can shift the value of
δ for any given console in any significant way, and they will usually choose their strategy regardless
of what they believe other software titles will do; most of a title’s sales occur in the first 3 months
of release, and as long as there are sufficient numbers of consumers on board each platform at
that given moment, these titles will typically multihome. On the other hand, for most mid and
low-quality titles, the first-order impact of porting costs on profits typically dwarfs the impact of
any small shifts in installed bases across consoles implied by changes in δ.
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6 Policy Experiment: Banning Vertical Integration and
Exclusive Contracting
This section uses the estimates obtained so far to compute a counterfactual environment whereby
console providers are prevented from integrating into software development and producing first
party titles, and are unable to offer exclusive contracts to third-party titles. However, third-party
titles still may voluntarily choose to be exclusive if they find the costs of porting too high.
As mentioned before, such a change in the contracting space may also have affected the entry
or exit of software products. For example, integration may have encouraged investment in first-
party software that otherwise would not have been produced. To account for the possibility that
there might be changes in the space of software products, I consider two cases: (i) first-party titles
are assumed to still enter the market as third-party titles; (ii) all first party titles no longer are
produced and thus do not enter. These two alternatives can be used as potential proxies for what
actually may occur absent exclusivity and integration.
Some caveats still remain. Although software providers form expectations over the future quality
and prices of products when deciding which platforms to join, I assume prices are the same as
observed price paths in the data when computing the outcomes of the counterfactual regimes.
Without a full model governing the dynamic price setting behavior of firms, these counterfactual
price paths become difficult to determine.78
6.1 Industry Structure
The results from the counterfactual simulations are presented in table 13. Generally, more titles
are predicted to multihome and port than observed in the data, which is expected. In the first
specification when former first-party titles still enter the market as third-party titles, the change
in market shares is stark: Sony’s PS2 is predicted to command over 75% of the market by October
2005 as opposed to half, and sells nearly double the number of consoles and nearly 5 times as many
total copies of software as before. On the other hand, the Xbox does significantly worse, selling 5M
fewer consoles and nearly half as many copies of games. The relative success of Nintendo’s GC is
less clear; it loses market share and sells approximately the same number of hardware devices, but
does manage to sell more software titles. The reason that the response of the Xbox and GC are
different is because the Xbox, which sells at the same price point as the PS2, is more of a direct
competitor and substitute for the PS2. Without exclusive titles distinguishing the PS2 from the
Xbox, most consumers will select the PS2 due to its higher predicted fixed effect and 14 month
head start in accumulating a larger installed base and software library. However, consumers may
still flock to the GC because of its cheaper price – it appeals to price sensitive consumers as a first
78Nair (2007) provides one possible approach to modelling a firm’s dynamic pricing decision. Nesting this type
of optimization problem within this paper’s dynamic hardware and software demand system while still accounting
for the endogenous selection of heterogenous consumers across platforms is too computationally burdensome for
implementation. Nonetheless, I also compute the counterfactual simulations assuming software prices follow a first-
order Markov process estimated in the appendix, and find that results do not change significantly.
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console, and also to other owners of the PS2 or Xbox for its titles that may still be voluntarily
exclusive or potentially of higher quality.79
The second specification conducts the same exercise, except now removes all former first-party
titles from consideration. The industry as a whole does worse off since most of the first-party titles
were blockbuster hits; nonetheless, because the PS2 still captures a majority of the market and
enough software products, it still does better than it did originally. Here, both the Xbox and GC
are predicted to do significantly worse, with each selling far fewer consoles and software titles as
they did in the presence of exclusivity. Recall table 2 showed nine of the top ten titles sold on GC
were first party titles, and that table 5 indicated the first party titles on GC were shown to be
much higher quality on average; if the inability to vertically integrate leads to the absence of these
former first party titles, then it is unsurprising that the total number of titles sold on the GC is
predicted to drop precipitously in their absence.
6.2 Consumer Welfare
By removing exclusive arrangements, users onboard each platform are predicted to have access to
a greater selection of high quality titles. To analyze consumer welfare gains, I calculate the com-
pensating variation for consumers who are predicted to purchase a console in each counterfactual
environment.
In the first regime where first-party titles still enter the market, I find that total consumer
welfare increases by approximately $7B holding fixed hardware and software prices and entry. Half
of this increase is realized by those consumers who would have purchased a videogame console
in the previous regime; these consumers receive on average approximately $72 more in surplus.
The other half of consumer welfare increase is realized by new consumers who previously did not
purchase a console, but now would; 26M new households on average receive approximately $140 in
surplus. However, in the second regime whereby first-party titles are no longer produced, consumer
welfare is predicted to increase only by $.7B with existing purchasers gaining on average only $10,
and new purchasers (of which there are far fewer) approximately $80. The loss of first-party titles,
thus, drastically reduces the potential gain from increased software compatibility.
Both of these calculations again ignore the possibility that Microsoft or Nintendo may have
exited the market, or Sony, with its increased market power, may have increased prices. For
example, in the first regime if Microsoft and Nintendo did not enter at all due to the inability to
integrate or obtain exclusive titles, total consumer welfare would be predicted to have fallen by
$1B despite having all titles onboard a single console. Similarly, I find Sony – holding the prices
fixed for the Xbox and GC – would have found it profitable to raise the price of its PS2 unit by
over $200, again eliminating most consumer welfare gains in either counterfactual regime.
79For titles released on multiple consoles on the data, different platform-title specific fixed effects are estimated.
As a result, the utility from the same title may be different onboard different consoles.
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6.3 Discussion and Policy Implications
Counterfactual experiments suggest that vertical integration and exclusive contracts were generally
pro-competitive at the platform level, benefiting Microsoft and Nintendo in terms of market share
and helping them establish a substantial foothold into the sixth-generation videogame market. The
PS2 had already captured an installed base of 5M users before its two competitors entered a year
later; as a result, without exclusivity, the Xbox and GC would likely only have been able to induce
a developer to release a title for their respective console after a version had already been developed
for the PS2.
Furthermore, with Sony commanding over three-quarters of the market, it is likely that it
could have sustained higher prices – although it may not have necessarily charged a higher entry
price, it would nevertheless not have been as hard pressed to anticipate or match Microsoft’s and
Nintendo’s console price cuts in 2001 and 2003. Combine this with the possibility that Microsoft
and Nintendo may not have found it profitable to remain in the videogame industry and either
exited or not produced their seventh generation consoles, any immediate consumer gains from
increased access to software may very likely have been offset by these dynamic consequences of
monopolization. Thus, although such welfare calculations are sensitive to the assumptions used
concerning entry, exit, and price setting behavior, the implications governing industry structure,
market concentration, and platform competition appear to be robust.
It is worth stressing that although exclusive arrangements may have encouraged platform compe-
tition, this does not necessarily imply that they encouraged software competition. In the videogame
industry, without modelling the entry and exit of new titles, the effect on software is ambiguous –
having only a single monopoly platform to support might have reduced porting costs required for
a third-party developer since only one console would have to be developed for, but a more compet-
itive environment with multiple integrated platform providers might have increased investment in
first-party software or led to fiercer competition among platforms for titles through reduced royalty
rates or increased development and marketing assistance.
In other industries, the impact of vertical integration and exclusivity on software competition
is more clear. For example, consider Microsoft’s integration of its “hardware” (Windows OS) into
the browser and media application space. The courts in both US v. Microsoft and European Union
v. Microsoft ruled that these actions resulted in foreclosure of competing software vendors (e.g.,
Netscape and Real Networks). Although both the videogame industry and the PC industry are
similar hardware-software environments, the fact that PC applications are very close substitutes
(consumers typically only use one word processor, browser, media player, or spreadsheet program),
whereas videogames are not (buying one action game does not preclude the purchase of another),
indicates that “upstream” software foreclosure may be more of a concern when such substitutability
is an issue. The results of this analysis, if extended to the PC industry, would likely indicate that
vertical integration and exclusivity into software development may aid other platform providers
(such as MacOS and Linux) in competing against Windows.
A more suitable comparison to the videogame industry is in television distribution, specifically
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with regards to competition between satellite and cable providers for exclusive content. In the US,
DirecTV’s exclusive contracts with certain content providers – notably with the National Football
League for a package of its out-of-market games – substantially contributed to its success and
ability to induce consumers to substitute away from cable. The impact of this competition was
substantial: Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) estimate that entry by satellite providers reduced cable
prices by about 15% and encouraged improvements in cable quality, yielding aggregate welfare
gains of approximately $5B. In this regards, the U.S. Senate’s recent actions which prevented
an exclusive deal between Major League Baseball and DirecTV – as detailed in footnote 9, an
intervention motivated mainly by a static efficiency desire to expand consumer access – may have
negatively affected competition in the industry. Without these exclusive carriage deals, cable
providers as well as other incumbent distribution channels in similar media markets would have
faced less competitive pressure.
At the same time, in other industries platform competition may not be desirable and monop-
olization actually preferable. Often this is true when a dominant platform provider cannot raise
prices or otherwise exercise market power. For example, consider the two main competing stan-
dards for next generation DVDs – Blu-ray and HD-DVD, sponsored primarily by Sony and Toshiba,
respectively. Here, even if one standard wins and “monopolizes” the market, that platform sponsor
cannot increase prices since it has already committed to licenses and royalty rates with hardware
manufacturers and movie studios. At the same time, having a single clear standard emerge as
the dominant platform will effectively remove uncertainty from the marketplace and likely spur
consumer adoption, thereby increasing total welfare.80 As a consequence, integration and exclusive
contracting between the standard sponsors and motion picture studios (e.g., Sony’s ownership of
Columbia Pictures or Toshiba’s exclusive marketing deal with Paramount) – although, according
to the analysis of this paper, “pro-competitive” in encouraging the existence of multiple formats –
may actually be contributing to an undesirable and lengthy standards battle.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown that integration and exclusive contracting between console manufacturers
and software developers in the videogame industry likely encouraged and enabled platform com-
petition. Evidence suggests that in this and other platform markets where upstream foreclosure
is not a concern and where forced exclusivity contracts are not permitted, antitrust intervention
or regulation may not be necessary. Furthermore, when evaluating the possibility of foreclosure or
entry deterrence in dynamic networked environments, traditional static analysis may fail to uncover
significant pro-competitive effects of exclusive vertical arrangements.
This paper focused on developing the methodological tools and framework to empirically mea-
sure the impact of these exclusive arrangements. On the consumer side, I developed a demand
system that could handle the dynamic selection of forward-looking, heterogeneity agents across
80See, e.g., Farrell and Saloner (1985) and Katz and Shapiro (1986).
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platforms. On the software supply side, I detailed and estimated a computationally tractable
dynamic network formation game which allowed agent’s to anticipate the future actions of other
players by conditioning on them through a small dimensional set of state variables.
Although counterfactual simulations indicate that the industry is far more competitive when
exclusive arrangements are allowed, it is true that consumers may immediately benefit from the
access to a wider selection of software titles onboard a platform when these arrangements are
prohibited. Whether or not consumers would have been better or worse off as a whole depends
crucially on whether the incumbent would have raised prices in response to its monopoly power,
and whether or not competing platform providers would have exited. Either would be sufficient to
eliminate any potential consumer welfare gains.
To make analysis tractable, a few key assumptions were made and carried throughout the paper.
First, I assumed the independence of software titles; in other types of platform industries, there
may be stronger substitution effects across upstream products. Secondly, to model the dynamic
decisions for both consumers and firms, I relied on assuming product characteristics evolved accord-
ing to Markov processes consistent with their realized empirical distributions. Finally, I abstracted
away from software entry and exit decisions as well as the (dynamic) platform pricing problem.
Some robustness checks and alternative formulations were explored, and it is unlikely that relaxing
these assumptions would dramatically change the results of the counterfactual exercises. However,
completely addressing these issues is beyond the scope of this paper and the subject of future work.
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A Demand System: Further Details
This section of the appendix provides further details on the specification, estimation, computation, and
robustness checks for the consumer demand analysis.
A.1 Multiple Hardware Purchases
To reduce the number of options a consumer has at any period in time, I will assume that a consumer can
purchase at most one console per period, will never purchase a console she has already bought, and can
return in any future period to purchase another console. The consumer’s value function for being able to
purchase a new console is thus given by:
Vi(Ii,t, ²i,t,Ωi,t) = max{max
j /∈Ii,t
uijt(Ii,t, ωi,t(Ωi,t)) + βE[Vi(Ii,t ∪ {j}, ²i,t+1,Ωi,t+1|Ωi,t],
ui,0,t(Ii,t) + βE[Vi(Ii,t, ²i,t+1,Ωi,t+1)|Ωi,t]} (21)
That is, a consumer will either choose to purchase or not purchase a new console, and if she does decide to
buy, she will purchase the one that delivers the highest expected lifetime utility. In either case, she accounts
for the continuation or option value of remaining on the market and updates her inventory state depending
on her chosen action.
I modify assumption 3.2 to account for the dependence of mean-hardware utility on inventory:
Assumption A.1. For any inventory state Ii,t, (consumers perceive that) {δijt(Ii,t)}j∈Jt can be summarized
by an exogenous first-order Markov Process:
F ({δi,j,t+1(Ii,t)}j∈Jt+1 |Ωi,t) = Fi({δi,j,t+1(Ii,t)}j∈Jt+1 |{δi,j,t(Ii,t)}j∈Jt , Ii,t,m(t)) (22)
where now the evolution is not only individual specific, but inventory state specific as well. Using this
assumption and assumption 3.1 on ², (21) can be integrated over ² and rewritten as:
EVi({δi,j,t(Ii,t)}j∈Jt , Ii,t,m(t)) = (23)
ln
( ∑
j′ /∈Ii,t
(
exp(δi,j′,t(Ii,t) + EVi({δi,j,t(Ii,t ∪ {j′})}j∈Jt , Ii,t ∪ {j′},m(t+ 1)))
)
+exp(βE[EVi({δi,j,t+1(Ii,t)}j∈Jt ,m(t+ 1))|{δi,j,t(Ii,t)}j∈Jt ,m(t)])
)
The only remaining issue is that the equations which govern the predicted share of consumers which
purchase a console must now integrate over the distribution of not only consumer types, but consumer
inventory states as well. Accounting for this as well as the evolution of consumer inventories over time are
provided in A.3 when computational details are discussed.
A final concern governs the software purchase decision of consumers who own multiple consoles – a
consumer who has already purchased a title on one console she owns should not typically also purchase the
same title on a second console. Unfortunately, correcting for this would involve tracking the inventory of
software purchases for each consumer, which is not computationally feasible. Instead, I will assume that
if a title is released on multiple consoles, than any consumer who owns multiple consoles is equally as
likely to purchase the title on any particular console, and adjust the potential market size each title faces
accordingly.81
A.2 Other Industry-Specific Issues
There are a few remaining institutional specifics that affect the estimation of the model.
81E.g., consider a title released on both the PS2 and Xbox. For demand faced on the PS2, the title is assumed to
face a market of all consumers who only own the PS2 plus one-half of those consumers who own both the PS2 and
Xbox.
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The first involves an issue of staggered platform release dates: Sony’s PS2 console was released in October
2000, whereas the Nintendo GC and Microsoft Xbox were not released until November 2001. Consequently,
for a portion of the data, only one console was available. Nonetheless, consumers knew that the GC and
Xbox would be released during the 2001 holiday season even a year in advance of the actual release.82 As
a result, I model the consumer’s relevant problem from October 2000 to October 2001 as a finite horizon
optimal stopping problem with only one hardware console available, and assume that consumers know the
starting values for the new products when they are introduced in November 2001.
The second is that the PS2 is backwards compatible with titles released for Sony’s previous generation
console, the original Playstation (PS1). Any utility derived from titles released for the PS1 prior to October
2000 as well as expectations over future software availability would be subsumed in the PS2’s fixed-effect;
however, any unexpected utility from PS1 titles released afterwards would not be accounted for. From the
release of the PS2 in October 2000, there were 387 titles released for the PS1, 332 of which were not also
released for the PS2. None of these were large successes. Since it is impossible to differentiate whether or not
purchasers of these software titles owned a PS1, PS2, or perhaps even both, I will assume that these titles
do not influence a consumer’s decision to purchase a PS2. It seems reasonable that a consumer interested
in playing older generation titles either would already own one or purchase the much cheaper console, and
that the role of these new PS1 titles on the decision to purchase a PS2 is marginal at best.
Thirdly, the PS2 exhibited shortages during the first few months of its launch and supply was not able
to meet demand, and without correction the model would potentially predict a lower value for δi,j,t than
the true value for those early months. However, if I assume that during these months access to the console
was independent of consumer heterogeneity (and consumers purchased in the same proportion had there not
been a shortage), then ignoring the implied δi,j,t for the first few months during estimation would still yield
consistent results.83 Doing so did not significantly affect results.
A.3 Computational Details
For notational purposes, let ι index the “inventory-state,” where ι ∈ {0, 1}3 and denotes which platforms
are owned in each state. Slightly abusing notation, ι = 0 will indicate no platforms are owned; ι = 7 that
all 3 have been purchased. As noted before, I discretize the distributions of αp and αγ to model consumer
heterogeneity. Consequently, consumers can be divided among R groups (indexed by i, each with price-
sensitivity and gaming-preference coefficients (αpi , α
γ
i ) and initial population share λi,t=0,ι=0 according to
the distributional assumptions given. At each period, the fraction of each type of consumer on a given
console is given by λji,t,ι. For estimation, α
γ takes on 11 distinct values, and αp has 5, resulting in R = 55
distinct consumer types.
As discussed, the estimation routine has the following main steps:
• To evaluate a candidate θ, iterate on the following until convergence on set of software utilities {Γj,t}∀j,t
is obtained:
i Hardware Adoption: For a given {Γnj,t}∀j,t, determine mean console utilities {δi,j,t,ι}∀i,j,t,ι which
match observed shares in data with those predicted by the model. Also obtain distribution of
consumer types who have purchased a given console at any period of time.
ii Software Adoption: Given the distribution of consumers onboard any hardware platform, com-
pute mean software utilities {ζj,k,t}∀j,k,t for every software title on every platform that, again,
match observed shares in data with those predicted by the model. Update implied software
utilities {Γn+1j,t }∀j,t.
• Computation of Likelihood: Obtain ξ(θ) and η(θ) from recovered mean-utilities δ and ζ, and form
likelihood L(θ).
82Microsoft officially announced the Xbox on March 10, 2000 and Nintendo announced the GC on August 25, 2000,
although their existence was rumored for months prior. As often is the case, console manufacturers announce the
upcoming release of a new console far in advance to drum up support from software developers and interest from
consumers.
83This is equivalent to removing the initial values of ξj,t for the PS2 from the likelihood function specified in the
next section.
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Details are as follows.
Hardware Adoption
For any inventory state ι, note that the values {δi,j,t}j∈Jt are sufficient to compute the expected probabilities
that a consumer, prior to realizing ²i,t, will purchase any hardware console at time t:
sˆi,t({δi,j,t}j∈Jt ,m(t), β) =
exp(δi,t)
exp(δi,t) + exp(βE[EVi(δi,t+1,m(t+ 1))|δi,t) (24)
as well as the probability a consumer purchases a particular hardware platform j conditional on purchasing
any platform:
sˆi,j|t({δi,j,t}j∈Jt) =
exp(δi,j,t)
exp(δi,t)
(25)
(These are the standard “logit” closed form expressions derived from integrating over the extreme value
errors ²i,t). Thus, provided the values of {δi,j,t}j∈Jt for each consumer i, aggregation over (24) and (25)
yields the total predicted share of consumers (who have not yet purchased a console) that purchases console
j at time t:
sˆj,t({δi,j,t}j∈Jt ,m(t), β, α,Σ) =
∫
αp,αγ
sˆit(·)sˆij|t(·)dPt(αp, αγ) (26)
where dPt(·) represents the distribution of consumer types who have not yet purchased a hardware system
at time t, and consumer heterogeneity is parameterized by mean α and variance Σ. The distribution of
remaining consumers dPt changes over time according to the population of consumers who have purchased
in previous periods; this is one of the primary ways the demand system generates interdependence over time.
Define the mean utility for the “mean” consumer (i = 0) of hardware platform j at time t and inventory
state ι = 0 as
δj,t,0 ≡ αxxj,t − αp0pj,t + Γj,t,0(αγ0 , αp0) + ξj,t (27)
For a fixed θ1, {Γj,t,ι}∀j,t,ι, and {λjr,0}∀r,j , the BLP contraction mapping
δnj,t,0 = δ
n−1
j,t,0 + ψ
(
ln(soj,t)− ln(sˆj,t(δn−1j,t,0))
)
(28)
is used to obtain to mean console qualities δj,t,0(·), where so denotes the observed share of potential buyers
who purchase console j at time t and ψ ∈ (0, 1) is a “tuning” parameter. For the following discussion, I will
omit arguments Γ, β, θ, and m(t) whenever it is possible to do so without confusion.
• At each stage of the mapping, implied market shares sˆj,t(δn−1j,t ) are computed according to:
sˆj,t(δn−1j,t ) =
6∑
ι=0
R∑
i=1
λi,tsˆi,t,ι(δi,t,ι; θ)sˆi,j,ι|t (29)
Recall sˆi,t,ι is the number of consumers of type i with inventory ι predicted to purchase any console
at time t, and sˆi,j,ι|t are the fraction of those consumers who choose console j.
– To obtain sˆi,t,ι(δi,t,ι) and sˆi,j,ι|t, the consumer dynamic optimization problem for a given δn−1j,t
and for every consumer type i and inventory state ι must be solved. Noting δi,j,t,ι = δj,t,0−(αpi −
αp0)pj,t + Γj,t(α
γ
i , α
p
i ; Iι) − (Γj,t(αγ0 , αp0; I0)), the transition kernel according to the regression in
(16) is first updated. I assume there is a finite horizon T¯ at which point {δj,T¯ ,0}∀j decays to 0,
and simulate forward 50 sample paths to compute the expected value function EVi({δi,j,t(Iι)})
given by (23).84 In practice, I assume this horizon occurs in January 2006, 3 months after the end
84I also explored using a discredited state space with a non-uniform grid (concentrating points in areas that are more
likely to be visited), simplical interpolation, and standard value function iteration for convergence. Even when using
a relatively sparse grid of 20 points in each direction for the δijt terms, the state space is of size 8×12×203 = 8×105.
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of the data sample; however, results did not change significantly when the horizon was extended
by 1 year.
– To compute λ, first shares {λi,0,0}∀i at t = 0 are computed from the distribution implied by θ1,
and then each future period is computed by updating the distribution of consumers remaining
on the market as follows:
λi,t+1,ι =
(1− sˆi,t,ι)λi,t,s +
∑
ι′∈I−(ι) λi,t,ι′ sˆi,t,ι′ sˆi,ι\ι′,ι′|t∑
i,ι′′ 6=7 λi,t+1,ι′′
(30)
where I−(ι) is the set of inventory states that can “reach” inventory state ι – e.g., differ only by
having one fewer console. In other words, the share of consumers with inventory ι at time t+ 1
are simply those that did not purchase a new console at time t (the first term of the numerator)
plus those in state ι′ at time t who purchase console j, where j is the only difference between
ι and ι′. To account for the growth in total market size (i.e., more television households are
present in each period), I assume that new households are distributed across consumer types
according to their initial distribution.
Software Adoption
As on the hardware side, note the mean utility for consumer i, ζi,k,t, is a sufficient statistic in determining
whether or not consumer i purchases software title k in a given period. The model implies that the share of
people who purchase title k is given by:
sj,k,t =
∫
exp(ζikt)
exp(ζikt) + exp(βE[EWi(ζi,k,t+1|ζikt)])dPj,k,t(α
p, αγ) (31)
where Pj,k,t(·) is distribution of consumer characteristics for those who own platform j but have not bought
software k at time t; it is a function of the hardware adoption decision for all consumers in periods τ ≤ t. It
is the evolution of this distribution over time and across platforms that necessitates the joint estimation of
software and hardware demand.
To obtain a starting value of Γj,t,ι for the hardware adoption side, I first assume {λji,t}∀t = λji,0 – i.e.,
the entry distribution of consumer types on each hardware platform is stationary across time. For a given
θ1, {λji,t}∀i,j,t, the software side proceeds in a parallel fashion to the hardware adoption side. For each console
j, the same BLP contraction mapping is used to recover mean software qualities ζj,k,t:
ζnj,k,t(θ1, {λji,t}) = ζn−1j,k,t + ln(soj,k,t)− ln(sˆj,k,t(ζn−1j,k,t))
• Implied market shares sˆj,k,t(ζn−1j,k,t) are computed as in the hardware side (except now there are only
two inventory states {0,1}), where the initial base of consumers who have not purchased a title is given
by the distribution of consumers on a given console at the time of the title’s release, and each future
period’s potential market size is updated accordingly. Again, the consumer dynamic optimization
problem given by (3.2) for a given ζn−1j,k,t is solved for every consumer type i, where one can updated
ζi,j,k,t = ζj,k,t − (αpi − αp0)pk,t + αγi . I discretize the state space into a uniform grid with 201 × 12
gridpoints, and employ Halton sequences for random draws on the evolution of ζi,j,k,t, simple linear
interpolation, and standard value function iteration for convergence. At each stage, transition kernel
is updated according to the regression in (17).
Initial results were similar to those obtained using a finite horizon, but this method did not scale well when the number
of consumer types increased and as a result became too computationally unwieldy. Attempts at using polynomial
approximations with shape-preserving splines were also unsatisfactory; similar to the issue raised in Section 9 of
Benitez-Silva, Hall, Hitsch, Pauletto, and Rust (2000), polynomial approximation routines do not capture the location
of the kink in the value function of a consumer’s optimization problem accurately. As this value determines whether
or not the consumer purchases, it is of central importance in computing the likelihood function, and thus these
inaccuracies render the approximations unsuitable despite their computational advantages.
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Once the expected value function is computed for each software title, consumer type, and time period,
Γ is updated according to (10).
Recovery of ξ and η
The hardware and software adoption algorithms are repeated until convergence on {λji,t}∀i,j and {Γj,t,ι}∀j,t,ι
is obtained. This yields {δj,t,0(θ1)}∀j,t and {ζj,k,t(θ1)}∀j,k,t.
I next recover ξj,t(θ1) as the residual from the regression of (δj,t(θ1) + α
p
0pj,t − Γj,t,0)− ρhw(δj,t−1(θ1) +
αp0pj,t−1−Γj,t−1,0) on (xj,t− ρhwxj,t−1). Similarly, ηj,k,t(θ1) can be recovered from running the appropriate
regression on ζk,t. The use of MLE and normally distributed errors allows for expressing θ2 as a linear
function of θ1 in this manner; i.e., θ2 can be “concentrated” out and a non-linear search is conducted only
over θ1. To estimate the software-title fixed effects, of which there are over a thousand, a partitioned
regression is used.
Finally, the log-likelihood provided by (13) can be evaluated from using the residuals defined in (12).
A.4 Fit of Model
Figure 4 plots the predicted values of {δj,t}∀j,t for the mean consumer. For this and all following figures, I
use the results from the full demand model given by specification (v) in table 3. Consumers’ expectations
of hardware mean-utilities {δj,t}∀j,t are assumed to be a function of the previous values across all consoles
as well as the time of year: as evident, values for each console do seem to track each other, and each is
drastically affected by seasonality with a large increase occurring during the holiday seasons. To determine
whether conditioning only on these past variables, as given by the parameterization in (16), provides a
reasonable approximation of consumer expectations, figure 5 plots the error in the realized value of δj,t+1
from the expected value implied by the estimated transition process Fi({δj,t}∀j ,m(t)). For the most part,
these predicted errors are relatively small, with their variance on average less than 15% of the variance in
the actual change in δj,t+1 − δj,t. There does not seem to be any persistent correlation or time trends. I
also computed these errors without explicitly accounting for seasonality effects, and errors were substantially
larger in magnitude – nearly quadrupling in variance – indicating once again the importance of controlling
for the time of year.
From the demand estimates, there is significant persistence in hardware and software unobservables with
ρhw estimated to be .65 and ρsw to be .81. A value of ρhw at .65 indicates the degree of variance in ξj,t
explained by ξj,t−1 is .652 ≈ 42%, which indicates there is relatively a large amount of unexplained variation
across periods in the hardware unobservable characteristics. However, this variation in ξ given by νhwj,t only
comprises 10− 15% of the total variance in δj,t across consoles, and thus does not necessarily indicate lack
of explanatory power on the part of the model.
The key assumption used for inference is 3.5, which states the evolution of νhw and νsw in unobserved
product characteristics ξ and η is independent of each other and the change in observed characteristics at each
point in time. Figure 6 plots the implied values of νhw for each hardware device. These values also appear
to be uncorrelated across hardware platforms and across time, something statistical tests cannot reject.
Thus, there do not seem to be any significant common shocks across platforms to hardware unobservable
characteristics that are not already accounted for by changes in the observed characteristics xj,t.
I next examine the predicted number of consumers who multihome and purchase multiple consoles.
Although the data indicates 53.2M sixth-gen consoles were sold, the model predicts 47M households actually
purchased one or more consoles – i.e., 12% of households are predicted to purchase more than 1 console, in
which only a very small number (< 1%) purchase all 3. Nielsen Media estimates that at the end of 2005, 43M
console households in the US.85 Although the model slightly underestimates the amount of multihoming if the
Nielsen data is accurate, it does provide substantial correction for the possibility consumers purchase multiple
devices. The model also indicates that different consoles exhibit different propensities for multihoming:
whereas 15% and 24% percent of PS2 and Xbox owners are predicted to own more than 1 console, over 32%
of GC owners do so.
85“The State of the Console,” The Nielsen Company, 2007.
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A.5 Robustness Exercises
Alternate Formulation for Future Software Utility
This section details an alternative specification for future software utility, Λj,t(·). I assume that consumers
form expectations over future software availability in a two-step procedure. First, every consumer has the
same expectations over the number of titles released in each month, which is itself is a function only of the
number of current software titles available and the time period (for age and month effects); secondly, each
consumer perceives the expected mean utility of each new title ζi,k,t, k ∈ Kj,R(t+1) is independently drawn
from a distribution that is consistent with the observed ζ’s of titles released in a given month.86
Assumption A.2. Let qj,t ≡ |Kj,R(t)|, the number of new software titles released for platform j at time t,
and let Qj,t ≡ |Kj,t| be the number of total software titles currently available (i.e., released during and before
period t). Consumers perceive the distribution of qj,t is a function only of Qj,t, m(t), and the platform j’s
age aj,t:
H(qj,t+1|Ωt) = Hj(qj,t+1|Qj,t,m(t+ 1), aj,t+1)
Additionally, the probability a future title has quality ζi,k,t is a function only of the platform and month in
which the title will be released:
J(ζi,k,t+τ |Ωt) = Ji,j(ζi,k,t+τ |m(t+ τ)) ∀ k ∈ Kj,R(t+τ)
Clearly, the number of titles released in a future period depends on more factors than just the number
of titles currently available, most notably the installed base of a given console. Nonetheless, there are
two reasons why assumption A.2 may not be problematic: (i) the total number of software titles currently
available itself is a proxy for the proclivity of further software development as it should in turn reflect the
size of the installed base;87 (ii) most consumers do not have accurate information as to a console’s current
installed base, but do know the number of titles currently available (given by simply looking at store shelves).
A consumer thus perceives future software utility of a platform as a series of iterated expectations over
both the number (qj,t) and quality (ζi,k,t) of software titles to be released in all future periods:
Λj,t(α
γ
i , α
p
i ) = Et
[
qj,t+1∑
k=1
ζi,k,t+1 + Et+1
[ qj,t+2∑
k=1
ζi,k,t + Et+2[· · · ]
∣∣Qj,t, qj,t+1]∣∣Qj,t]
Computation: Before the main routine is begun, I first estimate “offline” consumers’ beliefs over the
number of software titles released in future months, which is given by the distribution function H(·) in
assumption A.2. A natural candidate would be to use a poisson distribution. However, since there is
overdispersion in the data, a negative binomial fixed effects model similar to that proposed in Hausman,
Hall, and Griliches (1984) is more suitable. I thus assume h(·) has the density of a negative binomial, but
of a specification slightly different than theirs.88 The mean of the negative binomial is µ and the variance is
µ+ αµ2. I parameterize the conditional mean as ln(µ) = xµj,tβµ where x
µ
j,t contains both Qj,t as well month
dummies and platform age terms, and the dispersion term is parameterized as ln(α) = xαj βα, where x
α
j are
platform dummies. For estimation, I use the number of titles released for platforms which were released
86This can easily be extended to allow consumers to have adaptive expectations; e.g., expected software utilities
are drawn from the observed distribution of only those titles released prior to time t.
87Simple tests reject the hypothesis that installed base and software release numbers do not Granger-cause the
other.
88Cameron and Trivedi (1998) refer to the specification used by Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984) as an NB1
model, whereas I use what they refer to as the NB2 specification:
h(q|µ, α) = Γ(q + α
−1)
Γ(q + 1)Γ(α−1)
(
α−1
α−1 + µ
)α−1 (
µ
α−1 + µ
)q
where Γ is the gamma function (not to be confused with the definition of software utility Γ(·)j,t used in this paper):
Γ(a) =
∫∞
0
e−tta−1dt, a > 0
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in the sixth as well as fifth-generation, and extend out the sample to April, 2007.89 Once this model is
estimated, there is still the issue of forming consumer expectations at time t over the path of software titles
in all future periods. This integral is intractable, but can be approximated via forward simulation. For each
console and every t, I first take a draw on qj,t+1 conditional on observed Qj,t, and then proceed forward by
updating Q˜j,t+1 = Qj,t + q˜j,t+1, where q˜j,t+1 is the value previously drawn. Updating to a terminal value
and creating multiple sample paths allows for the approximation of {Et[{qj,t+τ}∀τ>0,∀j ]}∀t.
Table 14 presents the results of the negative binomial regression on the number of software titles released
in the next month as a function of the total number of titles currently available and age of the console. The
more titles currently available indicates the higher likelihood of titles being released in the future, whereas
age negatively affects this probability. Seasonality plays a significant role, with most titles likely to be
released in the months prior to the holiday season. Finally, there is overdispersion predicted in the data,
and α is predicted to be the largest for the PS2, which had the most titles released in the sample, and the
smallest for the GC, which had the least number of titles.
One question is the fit of this model in predicting the future number of titles released. Figure 7 graphs
the number of titles released for each console the 5% and 95% percentile of the predicted negative binomial
distribution. With only a few exceptions, the number of titles released for all three consoles fall within the
interval. The larger variance of titles released during the peak months and the differing variances across
consoles is captured by the model. Though only the dispersion fixed-effects for the sixth generation consoles
are reported, including the data from the previous generation of consoles helped match the observed frequency
of software releases to the confidence interval predicted by the model.
B Software Network Formation Game: Further Details
B.1 Assumptions and Computation of Profits and Costs
I make several assumptions governing how software firms form their expectations over the profitability of
developing for different sets of consoles, which includes how other software titles might respond to its choice.
Assumption B.1. ER(k)−τ [pk,R(k)] = pk,R(k) and Et−τ [ζk,R(k)] = ζk,R(k).
This assumption states that every software firm knows the initial price and quality of its title at the
time of release. As almost all titles are released at starting price points of $49.99, $39.99, and $29.99, a firm
typically knows the pricing entry point of its title before it goes to market. During development, the firm
should also have knowledge as to the title’s eventual quality, as proxied by budget and early feedback from
beta tests.
Assumption B.2. Software firms perceive their price will follow a first-order Markov process governed by
pk,t′ = Fp(pk,t′−1,m(t′)) ∀ t′ > R(k)
Table 10 provides an OLS regression of software prices on lagged prices, and shows that nearly all of the
variation in prices is contained in the previous period’s value. Additionally, although the number of titles
sold in the previous period is also a significant factor in determining next period’s prices, its inclusion in
this and the subsequent exercises did not significantly affect results; this is unsurprising given the limited
improvement in the R2 of the initial regression.
Assumption B.3. Firms perceive their mean-quality for all consumer types ζi,k,t can be summarized by the
first-order Markov process given by (9).
Assumption B.4. Firms perceive hardware mean-quality for all consumer types δi,j,t can be summarized
by the first-order Markov process given by (22).
Assumptions B.3 and B.4 deal with the expectations a software firm has over the evolution of its own
quality and the quality of each hardware platform, and imply that firms share the same expectations as
89The number of software titles released for each of the three sixth-generation consoles from November 2005 to
April 2007 was collected from http://www.gamespot.com, an online videogame website.
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consumers do over the evolution of products.90 When the environment does not significantly change (which
I will assume to be the case when only unilateral deviations are considered when computing porting costs),
these transition processes are the same as those already estimated from the demand system. Otherwise,
as will be the case when recomputing the contracting decisions for all software titles in the counterfactual
regimes, these transition probabilities will be re-estimated. Software title k is thus assumed to take the
transition probabilities over {δi,j,t}∀i,j,t as given, and sees its own action as only affecting the state at time t
but not other agents’ perceptions of the transition probabilities. Since title k is only affected by the strategic
actions of other titles only in so far as they affect the potential number of consumers on each console – i.e.,
through {δi,j,t}∀i,j,t – assumption B.4 allows for a title k to internalize how its choice of strategy affects the
actions of future software titles without explicitly needing to account for those decisions.
Finally, when predicting the values of ζi,k,t for title on a platform that it was not observed to have
joined, parameter estimates from the demand side, αy, are used. The title fixed effect is adjusted according
to platform fixed effects, separately estimated from a regression of software fixed effects on platform dummies
for those titles that multihomed.
I rewrite (18) as:
E[pik(sk; θC)|Ωrk−τ ] =
( T∑
t=R(k)
βτ+t−R(k)
∑
j∈sk
E[Mj,k,tsj,k,t((1− rmkupt)pj,k,t −mcj)]
)
− Ck(sk; θC)
where now Qj,k,t has been broken into two different components: sj,k,t, which represents the share of
consumers who purchase title k, and Mj,k,t, which represents the number of consumers on platform j who
have not yet purchased title k. sj,k,t is defined in (31), and is solely a function of ζk,t and the distribution
of consumer types onboard platform j who have not yet purchased the title. If IBj,t is the number of
consumers who own console j at time t, and IBj,k,t the number of consumers who own title k on platform
j, then Mj,k,t = IBj,t − IBkj,t, where IBkj,t = IBkj,t−1 +Mj,k,t−1sj,k,t−1. From the demand side, recall a
sufficient statistic for determining IBj,t is IBj,t−1 and {δj,t}∀j .91
To form the first part of E[pik(sk); θC ], only expected values of {{δj,t}, {ζj,k,t}, {pj,k,t}}∀j,∀t>R(k)−τ are
first required. I obtain these using a simulated frequency approach as in Pakes (1986): multiple sample
paths of these variables are created via forward simulation using the estimated transition processes from
the demand system (given by (16), (17), and table 10), and the appropriate quantities Mj,k,t and sj,k,t
are calculated at each point in time, again from the demand system. At release date rk, the predicted
hardware mean utilities {δj,t} are increased by the amount software k contributes to each platform it joins,
as determined by its choice of strategy sk.
C Proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 3.6
The proof follows closely Chanda (1954) and Bradly and Gart (1962), and provides necessary modifications
where needed.92 The assumptions required for the proof are as follows:
Assumption C.1. Let θ = (θ1, . . . , θk) and i ∈ {hw, sw}.
90Note that ζ includes price, and yet is assumed to evolve in an independent process from price itself. To address
this concern, I also estimate an alternative specification whereby I assume software mean quality net of price (i.e.,
ζ˜i,k,t = ζi,k,t + α
p,sw
i pk,t ∀ i) evolves according to a Markov process, and proceed in a similar fashion (whereby ζk,t
is constructed in each period from the separate evolution in ζ˜k,t and pk,t). Results do not change in any significant
way.
91Although for notational simplicity I have omitted discussing the distribution of consumer heterogeneity and
inventory states, these concerns are not ignored in estimation.
92NB: there is an error in Chanda (1954)’s proof of uniqueness which is addressed and fixed in Tarone and Gruenhage
(1975) (which also has a corrigenda in 1979).
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i. For almost all x ∈ < and for all θ ∈ Θ
∂ ln f i
∂θr
,
∂2 ln f i
∂θrθs
and
∂3 ln f i
∂θrθsθt
r, s, t = 1, . . . , k
exist.
ii. For almost all x ∈ < and for all θ ∈ Θ,∣∣∣∣∂f i∂θr
∣∣∣∣ < Fir(x), ∣∣∣∣∂2 ln f i∂θrθs
∣∣∣∣ < Firs(x) and ∣∣∣∣ ∂3f i∂θrθsθt
∣∣∣∣ < Hirst r, s, t = 1, . . . , k
where Fir(x) and Firs(x) are integrable over <, and E[Hirst(x)] < M i, where M i are finite positive
constants.
iii. For all θ ∈ Θ, the matrix J = [Jrs(θ)] with
Jrs(θ) =
 J∑
j=1
µhwj
∫ (
∂ ln fhw
∂θr
∂ ln fhw
∂θs
)
fhwdx+ µswj
∫ (
∂ ln fsw
∂θr
∂ ln fsw
∂θs
)
fswdx

is positive definite with finite determinant.
These are different from, and in a sense stronger than, those used in Wald (1949) for his general proof on
the consistency of MLE. The assumptions here, however, are easier to check and confirm.
Recall the log-likelihood function to be maximized is
L(θ) =
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=rj+1
fhw(νhwj,t (θ); θ) + Kj,t∑
k=1
fsw(νswj,k,t(θ); θ)

and nhwj =
∑T
t=rj
1 and nswj =
∑T
t=rk
∑Kj,t
k=1 1 be the number of observations for platform j, and N =∑J
j=1(n
hw
j + n
sw
j ) be the total number of error observations. Let θ
0 represent the true value of θ.
Consistency: Let θ0 ∈ Θ be the true value of the parameter vector θ to be estimated. Take the following
Taylor expansion for i ∈ {hw, sw}:
∂ ln f i
∂θr
=
(
∂ ln f i
∂θr
)
θ=θ0
+
k∑
s=1
(θs − θ0s)
(
∂2 ln f i
∂θr∂θs
)
θ=θ0
+
1
2
k∑
s,q=1
(θs − θ0s)(θq − θ0q)
(
∂3 ln f i
∂θr∂θs∂θq
)
θ=θ′
where θ′ = θ′(x) is a value that depends on x but for all x lies within the hyper-cell containing θ − θ0 as its
diagonal. Summing these Taylor expansions across i, j, t, k and dividing by N yields:
1
N
∂L
∂θr
≡ Lr(θ) = Lr(θ0)−
k∑
s=1
δsLrs(θ0) +
1
2
k∑
s,t=1
δsδtLrst (32)
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where
δs = θs − θ0s
Lr(θ) =
J∑
j=1
µhwj T∑
t=rj
1
nhwj
∂ ln fhwj,t
∂θr
+ µswj
T∑
t=rk
Kj,t∑
k=1
1
nswj
∂ ln fswj,t
∂θr

Lrs(θ) =
J∑
j=1
µhwj T∑
t=rj
(−1) 1
nhwj
∂2 ln fhwj,t
∂θr∂θs
+ µswj
T∑
t=rk
Kj,t∑
k=1
(−1) 1
nswj
∂2 ln fswj,t
∂θr∂θs

Lrsq =
J∑
j=1
µhwj T∑
t=rj
1
nhwj
∂3 ln fhwj,t
∂θr∂θs∂θq
∣∣∣∣∣
θ=θ′
+ µswj
T∑
t=rk
Kj,t∑
k=1
1
nswj
∂3 ln fswj,t
∂θr∂θs∂θq
∣∣∣∣∣
θ=θ′

From C.1 it follows that
Lr(θ0) →p 0
Lrs(θ0) →p Jrs(θ0)
|Lrsq| <
J∑
j=1
µhwj M
hw + µswj M
sw
With both fhw and fsw to consider, both Khintchine’s Theorem (Rao (1973), 2.c.ii) and Slutsky’s The-
orem are required for convergence results. E.g., since E[∂ ln f ij,t/∂θr] = 0, Khintchine’s Theorem proves∑T
t=rj
(1/nij)(∂ ln f
i
j,t/θr) →p 0; Slutsky’s Theorem handles the sum of two convergent sequences and leads
to the result Lr(θ)→p 0. The same arguments apply for the last two results.
The remainder of the consistency proof follows Chanda (1954) using the same notation, and is omitted
here.
Asymptotic Normality: Following Bradly and Gart (1962), substitute θˆ into (32), note Lr((ˆθ)) = 0, and
rearrange to obtain:
Lr(θ0) =
∑
s
(θˆs − θ0s)Lrs(θ0)−
1
2
k∑
s,q=1
(θˆs − θ0s)(θˆq − θ0q)Lrsq
for r = 1, . . . , k, or in matrix notation:
(L+G)(θˆ′ − θ0′) =
 J∑
j=1
µhwj T∑
t=rj
1
nhwj
∂ ln fhwj,t
∂θr
∣∣∣∣∣
θ=θ0
+ µswj
T∑
t=rk
Kj,t∑
k=1
1
nswj
∂ ln fswj,t
∂θr
∣∣∣∣
θ=θ0
′ (33)
where L = [Lrs(θ0)] and G = [(−1/2)
∑k
q=1(θˆq − θ0q)Lrsq] are k-square symmetric matrices. In the proof of
consistency, I have shown L →p J0 (which is positive definite, by assumption), and also can show G →p 0
since θˆ →p θ0 and |Lrsq| is bounded. Thus, for large T , L+G may be inverted and by Slutsky’s Theorem,
L+G→p J0 and (L+G)−1 →p J−10 . Rewriting (33) yields:
√
N(θˆ′ − θ0′) = (L+G)−1
 J∑
j=1
µhwj T∑
t=rj
1
nhwj
∂ ln fhwj,t
∂θr
∣∣∣∣∣
θ=θ0
+ µswj
T∑
t=rk
Kj,t∑
k=1
1
nswj
∂ ln fswj,t
∂θr
∣∣∣∣
θ=θ0
′
where the last term on the right, by the multivariate central limit theorem (Rao (1973), 2.c.iv), tends to
a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and variance covariance J0. It thus follows that the
asymptotic distribution of
√
N(θˆ′ − θ0′) is multivariate normal with mean zero and variance covariance
matrix J0−1J0J0−1 = J0−1 as T →∞ and µij constant ∀i ∈ {hw, sw}, j ∈ J .
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Table 1: Industry Summary Statistics
PS2 XBOX GC ALL
Hardware
Release Date Oct. 2000 Nov 2001 Nov 2001
Months Active 61 48 48
Price
Average $213.46 $185.47 $127.79
Std. Dev 62.72 47.36 36.50
Max 316.29 299.97 199.85
Min 147.37 146.92 92.37
Quantity (M)
Average 0.49 0.28 0.20 0.87
Std. Dev 0.44 0.25 0.23 0.86
Max 2.69 1.08 1.16 4.31
Min 0.18 0.08 0.04 0.18
Installed Base (Oct 2005) 30.07 13.32 9.83 53.22
Software
Total Quantity Sold (M)
Average 0.26 0.16 0.16 0.21
Std. Deviation 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.08
Median 0.50 0.30 0.28 0.41
Max 6.69 4.82 2.96 6.69
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Starting Price
Avg. $40.83 $39.63 $39.72 $40.24
Std. Deviation 11.22 10.69 9.83 10.80
Total # Titles Released 1161 749 487 1581
% Exclusive 52.4 33.4 27.5 62.7
% Exclusive, First Party 8.9 8.4 9.2 13.3
% Also on PS2 63.4 67.6 73.4
% Also on XB 40.9 56.3 47.4
% Also on GC 28.3 36.6 30.8
% On all 3 Consoles 21.6 33.5 51.5 15.9
# Titles Released Per Month
Average 19 13 8 37
Max 54 45 38 127
Min 2 0 0 5
Notes: Summary statistics for the PS2 are for the 61-month period between October 2000 and October 2005; for the
other two consoles are for a 48-month period beginning on November 2001.
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Table 2: Top 10 Videogame Titles for Each Platform by Quantity Sold
Release Quantity
Console Title Publisher Date Exclusive? (’000s)
PS2 GTA: Vice City Take 2 Oct 2002 Yesa 6,687
GTA: San Andreas Take 2 Oct 2004 Yesb 5,797
GTA 3 Take 2 Oct 2001 Yesc 5,588
Gran Turismo 3: A-Spec Sony Jul 2001 Yes 3,764
Madden NFL 2004 EA Aug 2003 No 3,446
Madden NFL 2005 EA Aug 2004 No 3,199
Madden NFL 2003 EA Aug 2002 No 2,728
Need for Speed: UG EA Nov 2003 No 2,533
Kingdom Hearts Square Sep 2002 Yes 2,460
Medal of Honor: Frontline EA May 2002 No 2,325
Xbox Halo 2 Microsoft Nov 2004 Yes 4,822
Halo Microsoft Nov 2001 Yes 4,157
T. Clancy’s Splinter Cell Ubisoft Nov 2002 No 1,521
GTA Pack Take 2 Oct 2003 No 1,379
Madden NFL 2005 EA Aug 2004 No 1,223
Project Gotham Racing Microsoft Nov 2001 Yes 1,216
Star Wars: KOTR Lucasarts Jul 2003 Yes 1,210
ESPN NFL 2K5 Take 2 Jul 2004 No 1,200
Fable Microsoft Sep 2004 Yes 1,125
T. Clancy’s Ghost Recon Ubisoft Nov 2002 No 998
GC Super Smash Bros Nintendo Dec 2001 Yes 2,961
Super Mario Sunshine Nintendo Aug 2002 Yes 2,157
Zelda: Wind Waker Nintendo Mar 2003 Yes 2,000
Mario Kart: Double Nintendo Nov 2003 Yes 1,922
Luigi’s Mansion Nintendo Nov 2001 Yes 1,748
Metroid Prime Nintendo Nov 2002 Yes 1,312
Sonic Adventures 2 Sega Feb 2002 Yes 1,188
Animal Crossing Nintendo Sep 2002 Yes 1,099
Pokemon Colliseum Nintendo Mar 2004 Yes 979
Mario Party 4 Nintendo Oct 2002 Yes 979
Notes: Summary statistics for the PS2 are for the 61-month period between October 2000 and October 2005; for the
other two consoles are for a 48-month period beginning on November 2001. a,b,c PS2 had a window of exclusivity for
these three titles: GTA: Vice City and GTA: 3 were not released on the Xbox until 2003 (well after they had both
become blockbusters for the PS2), whereas GTA: San Andreas, though initially developed for both Xbox and PS2,
was not released for the Xbox until 6 months after the PS2 game’s release.
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Table 4: Estimated Parameters of Demand System (continued): Month Effects
Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Variable Estimate Error Variable Estimate Error
Hardware dFeb 0.191 0.065 Software dFeb 0.090 0.012
All Systems dMar 0.078 0.084 Xbox dMar 0.101 0.015
dApr -0.266 0.095 dApr -0.262 0.018
dMay -0.533 0.100 dMay -0.334 0.019
dJun -0.085 0.104 dJun 0.087 0.020
dJuly -0.413 0.105 dJuly -0.011 0.020
dAug -0.513 0.104 dAug -0.017 0.020
dSep -0.336 0.102 dSep 0.028 0.019
dOct -0.554 0.097 dOct -0.167 0.018
dNov 0.031 0.087 dNov -0.045 0.016
dDec 1.037 0.066 dDec 1.011 0.012
Software dFeb 0.086 0.008 Software dFeb 0.056 0.014
Playstation 2 dMar 0.102 0.011 Gamecube dMar 0.058 0.018
dApr -0.185 0.013 dApr -0.275 0.020
dMay -0.216 0.014 dMay -0.345 0.022
dJun 0.162 0.014 dJun 0.088 0.023
dJuly 0.087 0.014 dJuly 0.018 0.023
dAug 0.040 0.014 dAug 0.049 0.023
dSep 0.116 0.014 dSep 0.048 0.022
dOct -0.095 0.013 dOct -0.077 0.021
dNov 0.110 0.011 dNov 0.252 0.018
dDec 1.120 0.008 dDec 1.207 0.014
Notes: Coefficients on month dummies are from model specification (v) in Table 3.
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Table 6: Estimated Hardware Own and Cross-Price Semi-Elasticities
PS2 XBOX GC Outside
Model (i) PS2 0.157 -0.002 -0.002 -0.279
Static (.132, .194) (-.002, -.002) (-.003, -.002) (-.344, -.246)
No Multihoming XBOX -0.001 0.157 -0.001 -0.151
No Heterogeneity (-.001, -.001) (.133, .194) (.002, -.001) (-.187, -.128)
GC -0.001 -0.001 0.158 -0.108
(-.001, -.001) (-.001, -.001) (.133, .194) (-.133, -.091)
Model (iii) PS2 0.166 -0.033 -0.029 -0.067
Dynamic (.131, .205) (-.043, -.024) (-.038, -.021) (-.083, -.052)
Multihoming XBOX -0.009 0.187 -0.011 -0.032
No Heterogeneity (-.012, -.007) (.147, .232) (-.014, -.008) (-.040, -.024)
GC -0.007 -0.009 0.192 -0.023
(-.009, -.005) (-.012, -.007) (.151, .239) (-.028, -.017)
Model (v) PS2 0.199 -0.049 -0.038 -0.066
Dynamic (.178, .199) (-.059, -.037) (-.049, -.025) (-.073, -.056)
Multihoming XBOX -0.013 0.234 -0.016 -0.029
Heterogeneity (-.016, -.010) (.209, .250) (-.021, -.011) (-.033, -.024)
GC -0.008 -0.012 0.245 -0.020
(-.011, -.004) (-.016, -.008) (.219, .262) (-.023, -.016)
Notes: Cell entries i, j, where i indexes row and j indexes column, provides the percentage change in market share
with a 10% decrease in the price of console i. 95% confidence intervals are provided in parenthesis below estimates.
Table 7: Estimated Software Own-Price Semi-Elasticities
DYN MH HET PS2 XBOX GC
Model (i) No No No 0.181 0.752 0.511
(.181, .181) (.752, .752) (.511, .511)
Model (ii) Yes No No 0.120 0.409 0.278
(.120, .120) (.409, .409) (.278, .278)
Model (iii) Yes Yes No 0.097 0.147 0.086
(.097, .097) (.147, .147) (.086, .086)
Model (iv) Yes No Yes 0.106 0.414 0.263
(.063, .155) (.322, .524) (.218, .318)
Model (v) Yes Yes Yes 0.110 0.165 0.089
(.041, .129) (.068, .219) (.037, .115)
Notes: Percentage change in total quantity sold of a top selling title on each console conditional on 10% decrease in
the price of that title. The software titles are Grand Theft Auto III for the PS2, Halo for the Xbox, and Super Smash
Bros. for the GC. 95% confidence intervals are provided in parenthesis below estimates.
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Table 8: Hardware Elasticities from Losing A Top Title
PS2 XBOX GC Outside
Model (i) PS2 -0.018 0.000 0.000 0.033
Static (-.021, -.016) (.000, .000) (.000, .000) (.028, .039)
No Multihoming XBOX 0.001 -0.056 0.001 0.055
No Heterogeneity (.000, .000) (-.066, -.050) (.000, .000) (.048, .064)
GC 0.000 0.000 -0.043 0.030
(.000, .000) (.000, .000) (-.038, -.043) (.035, .030)
Model (iii) PS2 -0.024 0.007 0.006 0.009
Dynamic (-.029, -.020) (.005, .009) (.005, .08) (.008 .011)
Multihoming XBOX 0.008 -0.090 0.009 0.014
No Heterogeneity (.006, .009) (-.104 -.076) (.007, .010) (.011, .016)
GC 0.003 0.004 -0.064 0.007
(.003, .004) (.003, .005) (-.075, -.053) (.006, .008)
Model (v) PS2 -0.022 0.013 0.013 0.005
Dynamic (-.029, -.018) (.010, .018) (.008, .014) (.004, .007)
Multihoming XBOX 0.014 -0.092 0.022 0.006
Full Heterogeneity (.010, .017) (-.116, -.072) (.014, .028) (.004, .008)
GC 0.004 0.006 -0.067 0.004
(.003, .005) (.004, .007) (-.085, -.054) (.003, .005)
Notes: Cell entries i, j, where i indexes row and j indexes column, provides the percentage change in market share of
console j upon console i losing a top software title. The software titles are Grand Theft Auto III for the PS2, Halo for
the Xbox, and Super Smash Bros. for the GC. 95% confidence intervals are provided in parenthesis below estimates.
Table 9: Hardware Elasticities from Forced Compatibility of Software Titles
DYN MH HET PS2 XBOX GC Outside
Model (i) No No No 2.294 1.039 1.292 -
(.705, 1.13) (-.141, .050) (.150, .224) -
Model (ii) Yes No No 1.081 -0.069 0.737 -0.932
(.835, 1.691) (-.520, .257) (-.125, .916) (-.966, -.854)
Model (iii) Yes Yes No 2.068 -0.668 0.413 -0.962
(1.823, 2.561) (-.843, -.503) (-.834, .894) (-.972, -.940)
Model (iv) Yes No Yes 0.461 -0.063 0.044 -0.311
(.345, .581) (-.103, -.018) (.000, .106) (-.380, -.257)
Model (v) Yes Yes Yes 0.745 -0.124 0.168 -0.389
(.574, 1.10) (-.195, -.082) (.018, .270) (-.543, -.329)
Notes: Percentage change in market share of each console subject to every software title “mulithoming” and joining
all three consoles. 95% confidence intervals are provided in parenthesis below estimates.
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Table 10: Software Price Regressions
Parameter Standard Parameter Standard Parameter Standard
Explanatory Variable Estimate Error Estimate Error Estimate Error
pricet−1 0.922 0.001 0.868 0.002 0.862 0.002
(pricet−1)
2 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
Qt−1 (10−3) 0.008 0.000
dFeb 0.659 0.073 0.645 0.073 0.817 0.073
dMar 0.560 0.073 0.545 0.072 0.717 0.072
dApr -0.108 0.072 -0.115 0.071 0.049 0.071
dMay 0.569 0.071 0.547 0.071 0.726 0.071
dJun 0.497 0.071 0.476 0.071 0.659 0.071
dJuly -0.315 0.071 -0.338 0.070 -0.169 0.070
dAug 1.227 0.070 1.175 0.070 1.345 0.070
dSep 0.249 0.070 0.221 0.070 0.391 0.070
dOct -0.296 0.069 -0.327 0.069 -0.157 0.069
dNov -0.062 0.076 -0.078 0.075 0.082 0.076
dDec 1.299 0.074 1.280 0.073 1.398 0.073
Constant 0.671 0.059 1.438 0.064 1.359 0.064
R2 0.924 0.925 0.926
# Observations 58337 58337 58337
Notes: OLS Regression of prices on lagged prices and quantities for each software title, pooled across all platforms.
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Table 11: Porting Cost Estimates, By Genre
(i) Action (ii) Family (iii) Fighting
Estimate 95% CI Estimate 95% CI Estimate 95% CI
PS2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
XBOX -1.048 -1.586 0.944 2.631 1.656 7.682 1.069 -2.461 3.853
PS2 & XBOX 0.792 0.245 1.380 0.424 -0.343 0.424 0.722 -4.424 0.815
GC -1.589 -2.156 -0.220 2.303 2.003 9.342 0.650 0.096 5.665
PS2 & GC 0.083 0.049 0.429 0.059 -0.084 1.398 0.650 0.011 0.924
XBOX & GC -0.736 -1.332 0.862 3.488 2.746 10.930 0.864 -2.529 4.284
All 3 0.849 0.422 1.221 0.641 -0.187 1.401 1.254 -2.890 2.185
cPS2 -0.247 -0.332 -0.009 0.447 0.353 1.381 0.314 0.235 0.974
cXB -0.131 -0.230 -0.033 -0.074 -0.074 0.085 0.023 0.011 0.931
cGC 0.015 0.009 0.038 -0.008 -0.272 0.023 0.135 0.079 0.282
# Titles 241 100 77
(iv) Platformer (v) Racing (vi) RPG
Estimate 95% CI Estimate 95% CI Estimate 95% CI
PS2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
XBOX 0.218 -0.291 3.613 0.413 0.413 1.772 2.784 -0.992 3.955
PS2 & XBOX -0.178 -0.462 0.588 0.901 0.691 2.686 -0.320 -0.355 0.694
GC 2.127 0.535 4.537 -0.155 -0.297 0.420 4.010 -0.373 4.920
PS2 & GC 1.724 0.341 1.724 0.231 -0.002 0.318 0.031 -0.055 0.554
XBOX & GC 2.567 1.467 22.392 0.470 0.470 1.899 3.326 -0.398 4.930
All 3 1.756 0.123 2.366 1.344 1.015 3.327 0.460 0.460 1.317
cPS2 0.255 -0.007 0.761 -0.020 -0.060 0.117 0.817 0.029 1.061
cXB 0.066 -0.063 0.115 -0.139 -0.475 -0.131 0.211 0.036 0.211
cGC -0.228 -0.321 -0.004 0.002 -0.005 0.035 0.034 -0.057 0.132
# Titles 103 197 173
(vii) Shooter (viii) Sports (ix) Other
Estimate 95% CI Estimate 95% CI Estimate 95% CI
PS2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
XBOX -2.254 -5.266 1.092 0.114 -1.379 0.219 -0.431 -2.034 0.219
PS2 & XBOX 4.761 -0.010 18.284 -0.043 -0.085 0.291 0.062 -0.447 1.265
GC -7.267 -14.554 -0.133 -0.025 -1.401 0.106 -0.384 -1.367 0.533
PS2 & GCa - -.202 - -0.181 -0.959 0.101 2.446 0.926 3.795
XBOX & GC -3.239 -3.240 5.030 -0.043 -1.404 0.146 -0.190 -0.190 16.922
All 3 1.470 -5.931 20.358 1.183 0.416 1.906 0.248 0.174 3.841
cPS2 -0.604 -2.039 -0.077 0.166 -0.142 0.202 -0.041 -0.295 0.024
cXB -0.407 -2.134 0.042 0.025 -0.032 0.039 -0.012 -0.238 0.022
cGC 0.764 -0.293 2.244 0.076 0.012 0.226 -0.003 -0.265 0.003
# Titles 163 308 207
Notes: Estimates of θC used to specify porting costs in (19) (units in $M), separately estimated by genre. Instruments:
constant, title fixed effect αwk , inverse of expected quantity sold (M). 95% confidence intervals are constructed taking
80 sample draws from the empirical distribution of the moment inequalities and re-estimating costs.
a No titles observed to have chosen this strategy, so no upper bound is identified. During computation of counterfactual
regimes, costs are assumed to be arbitrarily high for this particular genre and strategy choice.
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Table 12: Dynamic Network Formation Game: Predicted Fit of Model
Observed Data Predicted Data
Estimate Conf. Interval
Installed Base (M) PS2 30.07 29.40 27.91 29.59
XB 13.32 12.86 12.48 13.32
GC 9.83 11.02 10.53 11.22
% Market Shares PS2 56.50 55.18 53.92 55.54
XB 25.03 24.13 23.57 25.67
GC 18.47 20.69 20.15 21.46
# of Titles PS2 1161 953 559 1031
XB 749 943 787 1067
GC 487 795 556 884
# of “Hit” Titles PS2 578 585 427 613
(Sales > 100K) XB 296 293 272 309
GC 290 245 220 251
# of “Hit” Titles PS2 67 62 61 64
(Sales > 1M) XB 9 8 7 9
GC 8 11 10 12
Total Titles Sold (M) PS2 305.09 297.22 252.78 304.15
XB 118.05 115.07 105.26 123.93
GC 79.17 103.45 87.66 107.44
Notes: Predicted data obtained by fixing strategic platform choices for first-party titles, but allowing third-party
titles to re-optimize. Porting cost estimates are from table 11. Confidence intervals are computed by redrawing from
the estimated porting cost distribution for multiple sets of instruments, and recomputing a new equilibrium.
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Table 13: Counterfactual: Banning Vertical Integration and Exclusivity
Observed (i) CF #1: First Party Titles (ii) CF #2: No FP Titles
Data Estimate Conf. Interval Estimate Conf. Interval
Installed Base (M) PS2 30.07 58.02 57.09 58.42 37.80 33.85 38.16
XB 13.32 8.70 8.59 9.08 10.03 9.50 11.78
GC 9.83 10.06 8.94 10.43 6.04 5.60 6.39
% Market Shares PS2 56.50 75.56 75.17 76.25 70.17 66.51 71.10
XB 25.03 11.32 11.23 11.96 18.62 17.94 22.87
GC 18.47 13.10 11.78 13.58 11.21 9.75 11.82
Number of Titles PS2 1161 1175 756 1200 1008 448 1083
XB 749 1169 984 1259 963 810 1268
GC 487 936 592 982 502 142 666
# of “Hit” Titles PS2 578 997 731 1014 772 425 806
(Sales > 100K) XB 296 187 173 200 172 143 231
GC 290 376 303 396 69 32 76
# of “Hit” Titles PS2 67 325 315 329 155 127 159
(Sales > 1M) XB 9 5 4 5 0 0 2
GC 8 32 19 33 0 0 0
Total Titles Sold (M) PS2 305.09 1474.79 1380.50 1491.80 609.01 433.77 622.27
XB 118.05 69.19 61.42 74.12 60.04 50.69 87.55
GC 79.17 178.32 127.00 192.02 24.50 10.06 28.70
Notes: Counterfactual results allow all titles to re-optimize and choose the optimal set of platforms. CF #1 assumes
first-party titles are still present; CF #2 eliminates them. Estimates are computed using porting cost estimates from
table 11. Confidence intervals are computed by redrawing from the estimated porting cost distribution for multiple
sets of instruments, and recomputing a new equilibrium.
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Table 14: Estimated Parameters of Negative Binomial Regression
Parameter Standard
Variable Estimate Error
ln(µ) Constant 1.423 0.111
Qjt 0.003 0.000
Age -0.025 0.004
Age2(10−2) 0.032 0.004
dFeb 0.476 0.126
dMar 1.109 0.118
dApr 0.416 0.127
dMay 0.424 0.128
dJun 0.789 0.124
dJul 0.322 0.134
dAug 0.800 0.125
dSep 1.597 0.116
dOct 1.492 0.117
dNov 1.700 0.113
dDec 0.743 0.126
ln(α) Constant -0.245 0.292
dPS2 -2.270 0.476
dXBOX -2.502 0.595
dGC -3.000 0.748
Num. Obs. 458
Notes: Coefficients are from negative binomial regression of number of titles released at time t for seven consoles,
including four fifth-generation consoles. Only coefficients for sixth-generation consoles are reported for ln(α).
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Figure 1: Hardware Quantity and Prices
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Notes: In the top graph, bars represent the total number hardware consoles sold across all three platforms in each
month in thousands (scale on left); lines graphs indicate the total installed base for each console in millions (scale
on right). The bottom graph provides average monthly (nominal) prices faced by consumers in retail stores for each
platform.
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Figure 2: Estimation Algorithm
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Figure 3: Evolution of Installed Base
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Notes: Implied evolution of installed bases for each console for consumers with different values of αγ . Darkest area at
the bottom corresponds to the highest quintile of the distribution; lightest area at top corresponds to lowest quintile.
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Figure 4: Estimated Values of {δj,t,0}∀j,t
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Notes: Realized values of hardware mean-utility δ for mean consumer at inventory state ι = 0 (no previous purchase)
implied by the full demand model.
Figure 5: Difference Between Estimated δj,t+1,0 and Predicted Value E[δj,t+1,0|{δj,t,0}∀j ,m(t)]
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Notes: Errors between realized and predicted values of hardware mean-utility δ for mean consumer with no inventory
using the estimated Markov transition process given by (16).
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Figure 6: Fit of Model: {νhwj,t }∀j,t
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Notes: Predicted residuals in hardware unobserved characteristics from full demand model: νhwj,t ≡ ξj,t − ρhwξj,t.
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Figure 7: Actual and Predicted Number of Software Titles Released
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Oct-00 Oct-01 Oct-02 Oct-03 Oct-04 Oct-05 Oct-06
f
(a) PS2
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Oct-00 Oct-01 Oct-02 Oct-03 Oct-04 Oct-05 Oct-06
(b) XBOX
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Oct-00 Oct-01 Oct-02 Oct-03 Oct-04 Oct-05 Oct-06
(c) GC
Notes: Solid lines indicate actual number of titles qj,t released for each platform in a given month; dashed lines
indicate the 5% and 95% percentiles of the negative binomial distribution with parameters given in table 14 as a
function of total software titles available in the previous period Qj,t−q.
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